OBEYA, 26 I. & N. Dec. 856

Respondent Clement Obeya, a Nigerian lawful permanent resident admitted in 2004, was convicted in New York (2008) of petit larceny (N.Y. Penal Law §155.25) and sentenced to probation; later resentenced to 10 months for a probation violation.
DHS charged removability under INA §237(a)(2)(A)(i) as having a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) committed within 5 years of admission with possible sentence of one year or more.
The Immigration Judge ordered removal; the Board initially dismissed Obeya’s appeal; the Second Circuit granted review and remanded to the BIA to decide whether New York petit larceny is a CIMT.
The legal question turned on whether New York’s petit larceny requires intent to permanently (or substantially) deprive the owner — a traditional requirement for theft-based CIMTs — or whether a lesser (temporary) intent can suffice.
The BIA applied its decision in Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, adopting a ‘‘mainstream, contemporary’’ theft standard: intent to deprive either permanently or under circumstances that substantially erode the owner’s property rights.
The BIA concluded New York case law (People v. Medina and others) requires intent to permanently or virtually permanently appropriate or deprive, so §155.25 fits the Diaz-Lizarraga standard and is categorically a CIMT; Obeya’s removal was affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether NY petit larceny is a crime involving moral turpitude	DHS: eliminate strict permanent/temporary distinction; theft that substantially harms owner can be CIMT	Obeya: follow long-standing precedent — only intent to permanently deprive qualifies as a CIMT	The BIA held petit larceny (as interpreted by NY courts) requires intent to permanently or virtually permanently deprive or substantially erode owner’s rights and is categorically a CIMT

Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussed BIA precedent on permanent-taking requirement for larceny CIMTs)
Obeya v. Holder, [citation="572 F. App'x 34"] (2d Cir. 2014) (remanded to BIA to decide categorization issue)
People v. Medina, 960 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 2011) (New York Court of Appeals: larceny requires intent to exert permanent or virtually permanent control)
People v. Jennings, 504 N.E.2d 1079 (N.Y. 1986) (established requirement of permanent appropriation for larceny)
Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 2013) (construed Connecticut larceny statute differently than New York)
People v. Parker, 466 N.Y.S.2d 700 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (no larcenous intent where taking was temporary/borrowing)
State v. Wieler, 660 A.2d 740 (Conn. 1995) (Connecticut case allowing larceny without permanent-taking intent in some contexts)
People v. Guzman, 416 N.Y.S.2d 23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (affirming requirement of specific intent to permanently appropriate property)