Obaseki v. Fannie Mae
840 F. Supp. 2d 341
D.D.C.2012Background
- Obaseki sues Fannie Mae alleging race discrimination and retaliatory discharge under Title VII.
- Defendant moves to dismiss or compel arbitration; motion treated as summary judgment due to outside-pleadings evidence.
- EEOC issued initial right-to-sue letter on 10/02/2008 (received 10/09/2008); plaintiff had until 1/07/2009 to file.
- EEOC issued a Notice of Intent to Reconsider in 2009, leading to a renewed determination and a second right-to-sue letter on 9/29/2010.
- Plaintiff filed the complaint after 12/21/2010; IFP denial on 1/19/2011; plaintiff resubmitted 2/22/2011; court addressed timeliness and tolling.
- Court grants in part and denies in part; grants dismissal for untimeliness and denies arbitration as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of filing after 2008 right to sue letter | Obaseki filed within 90 days of 2008 letter. | Did not file within 90 days after 2008 letter. | Untimely under Dougherty rule; not revived by reconsideration. |
| Effect of EEOC’s reconsideration on deadlines | Reconsideration revives the 90-day period. | Reconsideration does not revive unless within original 90 days. | Reconsideration did not revive the deadline; still untimely. |
| Effect of 2010 right-to-sue letter on timeliness | Second letter reset deadline. | Second letter does not automatically reset without timely filing. | Untimely even considering 2010 letter. |
| Impact of IFP tolling on the 90-day period | IFP filing tolled the 90-day limit. | tolling temporary; does not extend beyond denial notice. | Tolling did not save timely filing; no extraordinary tolling shown. |
| Equitable tolling applicability | Delay due to administrative/clerical issues should be tolled. | Equitable tolling unavailable absent extraordinary circumstances. | No extraordinary circumstances shown; no equitable tolling. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dougherty v. Barry, 869 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (reconsideration does not revive after 90-day limit unless within period)
- Colbert v. Potter, 471 F.3d 158 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (statutory-like 90-day filing window subject to tolling and equitable principles)
- Ficken v. AMR Corp., 578 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2008) (IFP filing tolls 90 days; reconsideration timing matters)
- Williams-Guice v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 161 (7th Cir. 1995) (IFP denial and docket-fee payment timing affect tolling)
- Robinson v. Doe, 272 F.3d 921 (7th Cir. 2001) (IFP related filing rule in Seventh Circuit cited for tolling context)