O'Keefe v. Gist, 908 F. Supp. 2d 946

O’Keefe sues Gist and Girard over the 2009 transfer of his dog Boomer after it wandered, alleging due process, a declaratory judgment, and conversion.
The dog allegedly lacked a collar and owner identification; Boomer had a microchip registered to O’Keefe.
Girard’s Ordinance requires impoundment of stray dogs and reasonable efforts to contact the owner; it directs delivery to the County Animal Control.
Gist took possession of Boomer, investigated ownership by speaking with others, and ultimately gave Boomer to Hagan without notice or a hearing.
O’Keefe pursued state-court relief, obtaining an Order of Replevin and eventual full ownership in December 2010; federal suit followed.
The district court grants Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, concluding Count I fails to state a due process claim, and Count II and III are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or mootness.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does O’Keefe state a due process claim against Gist for taking Boomer without a hearing?	O’Keefe argues Gist’s transfer without notice violated due process and that microchip scanning was required.	Gist acted under Girard’s Ordinance; but if unauthorized, post-deprivation remedies may suffice.	Count I fails; post-deprivation remedies were adequate and due process was not violated.
Are post-deprivation remedies adequate where the deprivation is unauthorized?	Post-deprivation remedies were not adequate and a pre-deprivation hearing was required.	Adequate post-deprivation relief exists when ownership is not identifiable pre-deprivation.	Adequate post-deprivation remedies existed here; the state court action provided full relief.
Is Count II for declaratory judgment appropriate where Boomer’s ownership dispute is resolved?	Declaratory relief is needed to adjudicate the ordinance’s constitutionality ongoingly.	There is no concrete, ongoing controversy; relief would be advisory.	Count II not appropriate; no concrete controversy present.
Should Count III for conversion be entertained in federal court where federal claims fail?	Conversion arises from Gist’s improper transfer of Boomer.	Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction if no federal claim remains.	Count III dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Porter v. DiBlasio, 93 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 1996) (pre-deprivation notice required before permanent deprivation where ownership is known)
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (U.S. 1982) (pre-deprivation hearing not always required; procedural due process varies)
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (U.S. 1975) (due process rights in public school disciplinary actions (notice/hearing context))
Leavell v. Illinois Dept. of Natural Resources, 600 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2010) (post-deprivation remedies can suffice when deprivation is random or unauthorized)
Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2012) (post-deprivation remedy may be adequate or insufficient depending on context)
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (U.S. 1990) (framework for when pre-deprivation process is required)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (three-factor balancing test for procedural due process)
Wall v. City of Brookfield, 406 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2005) (post-deprivation remedies adequate where notice is not feasible)
Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1997) (due process minima and cost-benefit analysis in Mathews framework)
Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318 (7th Cir. 1996) (cited for post-deprivation remedies concept in due process context)