O'Connor v. Fresno-Community Hospital etc. CA5
F080109
Cal. Ct. App.Jan 31, 2022Background
- Brittany was admitted after a strangulation injury; physicians later declared her brain-dead and life support was withdrawn; death certificate lists date of death.
- Father Terrence O’Connor vocally objected to withdrawal of life support and to any organ/tissue donation because he sought an autopsy and suspected foul play.
- Hospital staff and Donor Network allegedly formed a plan to harvest organs without O’Connor’s consent, concealed that plan, and proceeded to harvest organs after effectively forcing O’Connor off hospital premises (he was given ~3 minutes to say goodbye).
- Donor Network (the designated organ procurement organization) harvested organs despite O’Connor’s objections and without both parents’ consent; O’Connor alleges statutory rights under California law and the UAGA were violated.
- O’Connor sued for multiple torts including intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend, concluding the complaint failed to allege conduct directed at him or recklessness in his presence.
- The Court of Appeal reviewed de novo, accepted the fifth amended complaint’s allegations as true, and reversed as to the IIED claim (ordering demurrer overruled for IIED and sustained for the intentional-interference claim).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the alleged conduct is "extreme and outrageous" (scope of conduct to be considered) | The relevant conduct is a course of conduct: secret plan to harvest, ejection from hospital, and the subsequent harvest — together sufficiently outrageous. | The only relevant act is the organ harvesting, which is not directed at plaintiff and not extreme enough for IIED. | Court: Consider the entire course of conduct; allegations (secret plan, ejection, harvest while plaintiff objected) are sufficient to plead extreme and outrageous conduct. |
| Whether defendants acted with requisite culpable state of mind (intent or reckless disregard) and whether that must be directed at plaintiff or occur in his presence | O’Connor alleged defendants intended to cause emotional distress by violating statutes/regulations and acted with reckless disregard; he was present and was ejected. | Defendants say intent wasn’t primarily directed at O’Connor, recklessness wasn’t in his presence (he wasn’t present during harvest), and Donor Network lacked notice of his objections. | Court: Allegations suffice to plead intent and reckless disregard; presence and awareness established by the ejection and prior objections; pleading stage the facts suffice. |
| Whether Donor Network can be charged given alleged lack of direct notice of objections | O’Connor pleaded agency/joint enterprise between Hospital and Donor Network and alleged shared knowledge of his objections. | Donor Network: no direct notice from O’Connor to its agents, so no culpable knowledge. | Court: Agency allegation is an ultimate fact properly pleaded; that allegation supports knowledge at pleading stage. |
| Whether sustaining demurrer without leave to amend and dismissing appealable; proper remedy | O’Connor sought reversal of dismissal and reinstatement of IIED claim. | Defendants argued demurrer sustain was correct. | Court: Reversed judgment as to IIED, vacated dismissal and demurrer order; directed trial court to overrule demurrer as to IIED and sustain as to intentional interference with human remains. |
Key Cases Cited
- Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868 (Cal. 1991) (defines IIED elements and requirement that intentional or reckless conduct be directed at plaintiff or occur in plaintiff’s presence)
- Fletcher v. Western Nat. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.App.3d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (course-of-conduct bad faith can be extreme and outrageous)
- Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal.App.3d 1463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (ongoing course of conduct and disregard for plaintiff’s sensitivity can support IIED even if plaintiff not physically present at initial act)
- Ragland v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assn., 209 Cal.App.4th 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (series of acts over time can constitute extreme and outrageous conduct; heightened vulnerability is an aggravating factor)
- Kiseskey v. Carpenters’ Trust for So. California, 144 Cal.App.3d 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (conduct may be considered alone or together as a course of conduct when assessing its qualitative measure)
- Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal.3d 311 (Cal. 1985) (standard of de novo review on demurrer and treating pleadings reasonably)
- So v. Shin, 212 Cal.App.4th 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (outrageous conduct test is fact-specific and generally for the jury)
- Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal.3d 148 (Cal. 1987) (insults and petty oppressions are not actionable as IIED)