Nowicki v. Cunningham, 669 F. App'x 52

Nowicki was convicted in Westchester County (2000 jury trial) of multiple sexual offenses and sentenced principally to 16 years' imprisonment.
New York Appellate Division affirmed and the state court of appeals denied leave to appeal. Nowicki then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition in federal district court.
The District Court denied relief but granted a certificate of appealability limited to whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecution questioning that allegedly used Nowicki’s post-arrest silence.
Nowicki argued counsel violated Strickland by not objecting to multiple Doyle-type impeachment questions about topics omitted from his custodial statements.
The government/respondent emphasized the strong evidence of guilt (victim ID, saliva DNA with extremely low random-match probability, Nowicki’s written statements suggesting possible or actual involvement) and argued no Strickland prejudice.
The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the state-court decision rejecting Strickland prejudice was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); thus habeas relief was properly denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecution questioning that used Nowicki’s post-arrest silence (Doyle claim)	Nowicki: trial counsel unreasonably failed to object when prosecutor repeatedly questioned witnesses and him about matters omitted from his custodial statements, implicating Doyle protections	Respondent: even if objections were omitted, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming so no reasonable probability of a different outcome (no Strickland prejudice)	Court: Affirmed denial of habeas. Appellate Division’s rejection of Strickland prejudice was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law; because of strong evidence, no need to decide deficiency prong

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong ineffective-assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (prosecutor may not use post-arrest silence to impeach defendant’s trial testimony)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (defines “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” standards under AEDPA)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (clarifies objective unreasonableness standard for Strickland under IAC review)
Tavarez v. Larkin, 814 F.3d 644 (Second Circuit: standard of review for district court denial of habeas)