Nowak v. Suthers
2014 CO 14
Colo.2014Background
- Nowak was convicted of two counts of aggravated motor vehicle theft and began an eight-year sentence in 2008, with PED calculated at 50% of that sentence.
- After reaching his PED, Nowak was convicted of felony escape and received a 12-year sentence to run consecutively in 2007, beginning service in 2007.
- DOC recalculated Nowak's PED by treating the sentences as separate rather than one continuous sentence, arguing 403(1) requires 50% of the latest sentence.
- The district court rejected DOC's approach and ordered recalculation using the one-continuous-sentence rule for PED.
- DOC appealed, arguing its interpretation should be given deference and that 403(1) and 101 are irreconcilable, or that non-harmful windfalls would occur if 101 is applied.
- The court held that 101 requires one continuous sentence for PED whenever multiple convictions with separate sentences exist, even if it yields parole eligibility before 50% of the second sentence is served.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 17-22.5-101 requires one continuous sentence for PED with multiple convictions. | Nowak argues for one continuous sentence. | DOC argues 101 and 403(1) irreconcilable; apply 50% to latest sentence. | Yes; 101 mandates one continuous sentence for PED. |
| Can 17-22.5-403(1) supersede 17-22.5-101 when later enacted? | Nowak contends 403(1) should control once PED is calculated. | DOC contends 403(1) may govern independently to ensure 50% rule. | No; they are harmonizable; 101 governs PED calculation. |
| Whether the court should defer to DOC's reasonable interpretation of statutes. | Nowak asserts no deference due to statutory text. | DOC argues deference is warranted for reasonable construction. | No; deference not warranted here. |
| Whether applying 101 creates an impermissible windfall for serial offenders. | Nowak faces no windfall concern; parole board discretion remains. | DOC argues windfall would benefit staggered offenses. | Rejected; windfall concern insufficient to override 101. |
Key Cases Cited
- Luther v. People, 58 P.3d 1013 (Colo. 2002) (interpretation of parole and time computations; statutory construction guidance)
- Spoto v. Colorado State Department of Corrections, 883 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1994) (aggregation of consecutive sentences for PED)
- Santisteven v. People, 868 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1993) (must combine all sentences for parole eligibility)
- Broga v. People, 750 P.2d 59 (Colo. 1988) (consecutive sentences treated as one for parole purposes)
- Green v. People, 784 P.2d 616 (Colo. 1987) (mandatory combination of sentences under 17-22.5-101)
- McKnight v. Riveland, 728 P.2d 1297 (Colo. App. 1986) (aggregation of sentences for PED)
- Badger v. Suthers, 985 P.2d 1043 (Colo. 1999) (consecutive sentences and parole eligibility)
- Vaughn v. Gunter, 820 P.2d 659 (Colo. 1991) (mandatory aggregation under 17-22.5-101)