Norris Carey, Jr. v. Joanne Throwe, 957 F.3d 468

Carey, a former MNRP officer rehired by Maryland DNR as a civilian, anonymously posted two Salisbury News Blog entries criticizing MNRP Captain Edward Johnson’s private Facebook photos and comments.
After being identified as the author, Carey was terminated from his DNR position (May 25, 2017), his LEOSA concealed-carry credential was challenged/rescinded, and Johnson posted a disparaging comment about Carey on the White Marlin Open Facebook page.
Carey sued: (1) First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his termination; (2) a § 1983 claim asserting LEOSA created a private right enabling him to enforce reinstatement of his LEOSA card; and (3) defamation per se against Johnson for the Facebook comment.
The district court dismissed all claims for failure to state a claim; Carey appealed.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed: the blog posts were not speech on a matter of public concern; LEOSA does not create a private § 1983 remedy; and Johnson’s Facebook remark was nonactionable hyperbolic opinion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the anonymous blog posts involved speech on a matter of public concern for First Amendment retaliation purposes	Carey: posts exposed misconduct or risk by a public officer and thus addressed public welfare	Defendants: posts complained about off-duty personal conduct and were interpersonal grievances, not matters of public concern	Court: posts were personal/off-duty boorishness, not a matter of public concern; retaliation claim dismissed
Whether LEOSA creates a private right enforceable under § 1983 to compel reinstatement of state-issued identification allowing concealed carry	Carey: LEOSA entitles qualified retirees to carry and thus creates a federal right he can enforce under § 1983 to recover his LEOSA card	Defendants: LEOSA uses permissive language, imposes no binding obligation on states to issue ID, and has no remedial provision; § 1983 relief is unavailable	Court: LEOSA lacks rights-creating language and an unambiguous state obligation; § 1983 remedy not available; LEOSA claim dismissed
Whether Johnson’s Facebook comment was defamatory per se	Carey: Johnson’s statement harmed his reputation and implied misconduct in his polygraph work	Defendants: comment was rhetorical hyperbole/opinion and not an objectively provable false statement	Court: statement is loose hyperbole/opinion not susceptible to proof as true/false; defamation per se claim dismissed

Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (public-employee free-speech balancing framework)
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (speech must address matter of public concern to trigger First Amendment protection for public employees)
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (limits on public-employee speech when speaking pursuant to official duties)
Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000) (public-concern inquiry considers content, context, and form)
Brooks v. Arthur, 685 F.3d 367 (4th Cir. 2012) (personal workplace grievances are not matters of public concern)
Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258 (4th Cir. 2007) (not every allegation of misconduct is necessarily public concern; systemic indicators matter)
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (three-factor test for whether a statute creates enforceable rights under § 1983)
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (statutory rights must be unambiguously conferred to support § 1983 suits)
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (defamatory false statements of fact, not opinion/hyperbole, are actionable)
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (anticommandeering principle limits Congress from directing state officers to implement federal programs)
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (reinforcing anticommandeering limits on federal power)