Norman Shelton v. Bryan Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554

SMU at USP-Lewisburg houses inmates with violent histories; inmates confined 23 hours per day with one hour in a recreation cage.
Shelton, an SMU inmate, sues for injunctive/declaratory relief on behalf of the class and damages for himself.
Allegations: officials place hostile inmates together and fail to intervene during inmate-on-inmate violence; improper use of punitive restraints for refusals.
Class defined as all persons currently or future inmates in the SMU at USP-Lewisburg, with the period starting from filing and continuing while the unconstitutional patterns persist.
Shelton’s claims stem from a November 2009 incident involving placement with inmate Carr; Carr allegedly threatened Shelton and assaulted him the next day, with some defendants allegedly present but not intervening.
District court denied class certification and granted summary judgment to defendants; Shelton appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ascertainability under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive relief class	Shelton argues ascertainability not required for (b)(2) injunctive class.	District court required ascertainability; class improperly defined.	Ascertainability not required for (b)(2) injunctive class; proper class defined and cohesive.
Proper class definition under Rule 23(c)(1)(B)	Class should cover all current/future SMU inmates as defined.	Lower court narrowed class improperly to those with specific injuries.	Court held proper to define broad class; district court must retain appropriate, cohesive definition on remand.
Role of Rule 56(d) declaration in Rule 56 summary judgment	Discovery needed; Rule 56(d) declaration supports delay or denial of summary judgment.	Rule 56(d) declaration not properly addressed; discovery not warranted.	District court abused discretion by not considering 56(d) declaration; remand to consider discovery issues.
FTCA exhaustion jurisdiction	Shelton exhausted administrative remedies as to the November 2009 incident; discovery would prove this.	No exhaustion for November 2009 incident; administrative claim not filed.	FTCA claim dismissed for lack of exhaustion; district court affirmed dismissal.

Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012) (ascertainability requires readily ascertainable class members in (b)(3) context; not controlling for (b)(2))
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (S. Ct. 2011) ((b)(2) class must be cohesive; notice not mandatory)
Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (cohesiveness and typicality considerations in Rule 23(b)(2))
Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1988) (Rule 23 requirements for injury common to class; named plaintiff must have real threat of injury)
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (S. Ct. 2011) (Eighth Amendment risk and future harm framework for class certifications)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (S. Ct. 1994) (deliberate indifference standard for Eighth Amendment)
Rochford v. City of Chicago, 565 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1989) (early notions of class definiteness in Rule 23(b)(2))
In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2004) (ascertainability considerations for (b)(2) with injunctive relief)
Shook v. El Paso County, 386 F.3d 963 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting strict ascertainability for Rule 23(b)(2) in some prison-population contexts)
Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972) (ascertainability not required where notice not mandatory)
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (S. Ct. 1993) (administrative exhaustion prerequisites; jurisdictional)