Mark SHOOK; and Dennis Jones, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Shirlen Mosby; and James Vaughan, Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellants, v. EL PASO COUNTY, Board of County Commissioners of El Paso County, and John Wesley Anderson, in his capacity as Sheriff of El Paso County, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 03-1397
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
Oct. 18, 2004
386 F.3d 963
Consistent with this view, the Eighth Circuit has interpreted the IMCA “to require only that the sentence imposed for burglary fall within the minimum, if any, and maximum established by state law.... Within that range, the sentence should be calculated according to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Norquay, 905 F.2d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Martinez, 274 F.3d 897, 906 (5th Cir.2001) (recognizing the Circuits “unanimously agree that [for assimilated crimes] state sentencing ranges should set the minimum and maximum length for federal prison sentences“). In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on our decision in United States v. Garcia, 893 F.2d 250, 254 (10th Cir.1989), in which we held the Assimilative Crimes Act,
III.
In this case, the district court properly ruled the IMCA assimilated only the range of punishment between the minimum and maximum sentences set forth in
AFFIRMED.
Gordon L. Vaughan, Vaughan & DeMuro, Colorado Springs, CO (with Sara Ludke Cook, Vaughan & DeMuro, Colorado Springs, CO, and Jay A. Lauer, Assistant County Attorney, El Paso County, CO, on the brief) for Defendants-Appellees.
Before TACHA, BARRETT, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
This case involves the unsuccessful effort by four former state prisoners to certify a class action challenging their lack of access to mental health care while incarcerated in the El Paso County, Colorado Jail. The district court denied them class certification and dismissed the suit based on its conclusion that under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act the relief the plaintiffs sought was “beyond the competence and the jurisdiction of [the] court.” Shook v. Bd. of County Comm‘rs of County of El Paso, 216 F.R.D. 644, 648 (D.Colo.2003).
The plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the district court applied the wrong standard in denying class certification. We take jurisdiction under
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Jail
The El Paso County Jail is located in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The Jail houses both men and women, including recent arrestees, persons awaiting trial, and persons convicted and sentenced to terms of two years or less under state law. Each of the four named plaintiffs1 in this suit was incarcerated in the Jail sometime between 2001 and 2002, either as a pretrial detainee or as an inmate.
B. The Class Action Complaint
On April 2, 2002, the prisoners filed a class action complaint under
In their complaint, the named plaintiffs allege that Jail officials have violated the prisoners’ constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to their mental health needs contrary to the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment‘s prohibition against punishment of pretrial detainees. In particular, the plaintiffs allege that Jail personnel subjected them to (1) inadequate housing and overcrowding; (2) inadequate inpatient care; (3) inadequate mental health facilities for women inmates; (4) improper treatment through the use of special detention cells, restraints, and pepper spray; (5) inadequate supervision to prevent self-harm or suicide; (6) inadequate methods of distributing medication; and (7) inadequate mental health staffing. They also assert that El Paso‘s management of the Jail has created a substantial risk of future harm to class members.
The individual plaintiffs each assert slightly different factual allegations to support their claims of deliberate indifference. The first, Mark Shook, maintains that he has been receiving psychiatric care since childhood for his conditions of Asperberger‘s Syndrome (a form of autism) and bipolar disorder. Before he came to the Jail in fall 2001, he regularly took antipsychotic drugs prescribed by his psychiatrist to control his symptoms. He alleges that after his arrival at the Jail, he had no access to doctors or medications for three weeks. When Jail officials finally allowed him to see a doctor, the doctor refused to prescribe his regular medications because they were not on the Jail‘s list of approved medications.
Plaintiff Dennis Jones asserts that he is bipolar, suffers from depression and anxiety, and has considered suicide. Prior to entering the Jail in September 2001 he claims a prescription of a combination of various drugs successfully controlled his symptoms. Jones claims that Jail officials denied him access to any medications for nearly a month after his incarceration, and when he finally obtained a prescription, he received only an insufficient dose of one of the drugs he needed. In addition, he alleges that Jail staff who monitored the levels of his medication through blood sample testing took the samples too soon or
Plaintiff-intervenor Shirlen Mosby alleges that she is bipolar and has experienced numerous attacks of anxiety, depression, feelings of hopelessness, and suicidal thoughts. She asserts that after her incarceration began in April 2002, Jail officials improperly placed her in special detention cells and Jail staff belittled her condition. She also maintains that because of inadequate supervision she was able to attempt suicide three times while housed in the Jail.
Finally, plaintiff-intervenor James Vaughan asserts that he is bipolar and has nearly continuous depression and anxiety. He claims that he had inadequate access to psychiatrists during his incarceration as a pretrial detainee beginning in May 2002. He also claims that he was deprived of medication for several days after he arrived at the Jail and never received the blood tests necessary to monitor the medication he finally did receive.
The plaintiffs allege that their lack of access to adequate mental health care is life-threatening. For example, they claim that the Jail officials’ deliberate indifference to prisoners’ mental health needs has led to the deaths of at least four prisoners and resulted in injuries to others.
C. The Procedural History
El Paso moved to dismiss the class action complaint, arguing that each class member was required to fully exhaust his or her administrative remedies under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act,
After oral argument, the district court issued an order denying both the defendants’ motion for dismissal and the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Although the district court noted that the plaintiffs had each alleged facts sufficient to show that El Paso was deliberately indifferent to their mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, see Shook, 216 F.R.D. at 646 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)), the court ultimately concluded that the PLRA precluded class certification because the “breadth [of relief sought made] the proposed class action not manageable with [the] court‘s limited jurisdiction.” Id. at 648.
In light of its ruling, the court granted the plaintiffs thirty days in which to file an amended complaint for individual relief. Id. at 649. By this time, however, none of the plaintiffs remained in the Jail and therefore they no longer had standing to seek individual relief. The district court accordingly dismissed the action. App. at 140-41.
The prisoners now appeal the district court‘s denial of class certification.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Whether the district court applied the correct legal standard in its decision to grant or deny class certification is reviewed de novo. Thiessen v. General Electric Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir.2001). “When the district court has applied the proper standard in deciding whether to certify a class, we may reverse that decision only for abuse of discretion.” Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668,
Although the party seeking to certify a class bears the burden of proving that all the requirements of Rule 23 are met, see Reed v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir.1988), the district court must engage in its own “rigorous analysis” of whether “the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.” Gen. Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). In doing so, the court must accept the substantive allegations of the complaint as true, J.B., 186 F.3d at 1290 n. 7; see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974), although it “need not blindly rely on conclusory allegations which parrot Rule 23” and “may consider the legal and factual issues presented by plaintiff‘s complaints.” J.B., 186 F.3d at 1290, n. 7 (quoting 2 Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 7.26 (3d ed.1992)).
B. The District Court‘s Order
We now turn to the district court‘s denial of class certification. Rule 23(a) requires an analysis of four elements which are preconditions to class certification: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of the named parties to represent the class.
In this case, the district court appropriately began its analysis by referring to Rule 23(a)‘s four prerequisites to class certification. Instead of applying Rule 23(a)‘s framework to the facts alleged, however, it moved to other “considerations controlling the motion for class certification,” including
whether the named plaintiffs and interveners have standing to assert the claims made on behalf of the putative class, whether the members of the class can be identified, whether the class allegations are broader than the constitutional claim, whether the putative class is manageable and, whether the court has the authority to order the prospective remedy requested.
Shook, 216 F.R.D. at 647. The court‘s evaluation of these factors turned primarily on whether the prisoners could in fact show an Eighth Amendment violation and whether their allegations, if proven, would entitle them to the relief they requested. The court did not address
In evaluating whether the prisoners could allege an Eighth Amendment violation, the court reached two conclusions. It first determined that because the Jail‘s population was “inherently fluid,” the plaintiffs could only prove that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the class‘s needs if the Jail used “an intake diagnostic procedure to determine persons having serious mental health needs.” Id. at 648. However, it concluded that intake screening was not constitutionally required
The court then determined that the prisoners’ complaint was really an attempt “to reform jail practices rather than to redress past constitutional torts and prevent their reoccurrence.” Id. at 647. The problem here, according to the court, was that the PLRA limited the federal court‘s ability to address such a complaint. Since it concluded that under the PLRA it could neither “prescribe jail practices for humane treatment of prisoners” nor interfere with the executive and legislative branches’ ability to structure prisons as they saw fit, the relief the plaintiffs sought was “beyond the competence and the jurisdiction of [the] court.” Id. at 648.2
C. The Effect of the PLRA on Rule 23
We first consider whether, as the district court concluded, the PLRA has changed the requirements for class certification under Rule 23. El Paso argues that the PLRA has changed the prison condition litigation landscape in a fundamental way that must be considered in the Rule 23 class action certification analysis. The prisoners respond that the PLRA affects only the remedies they can ultimately obtain and does not alter Rule 23.
The district court‘s analysis of the PLRA centered around the following provision that limits prospective relief in cases involving prison conditions:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall not give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
While the court determined that this provision did not entirely prohibit class action certification, it held that it did constitute a significant limitation on its jurisdiction to entertain class action suits by prisoners. Shook, 216 F.R.D. at 646. The question for us, then, is whether courts may consider the relief the prisoners seek in determining whether to certify a class under the PLRA. Our review of the PLRA leads us to conclude that it does not limit class certification decisions in this way.
In interpreting the PLRA, “[w]e begin, as we do any instance of statutory construction, with the language of the statute.” In re Geneva Steel Co., 281 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir.2002) (citing Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. N.M. & Ariz. Land Co., 632 F.2d 855, 857 (10th Cir.1980)); see also Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int‘l Ass‘n, Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 708 (10th Cir.1993) (“The objective of reading the
Our conclusion that the PLRA does not alter the class certification analysis under Rule 23 has been reached by other courts. The Fifth Circuit, for example, held that
In addition, courts have continued to allow prison conditions cases to be certified as long as the elements of Rule 23 have been met, even cases broadly challenging conditions of confinement. For instance, in Anderson v. Garner, 22 F.Supp.2d 1379 (N.D.Ga.1997), when the defendants argued that under
Thus, we conclude that Congress did not intend the PLRA to alter class certification requirements under Rule 23 and that the district court erred in concluding otherwise.
D. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
Having held that the PLRA does not add new elements to the class certification analysis, Rule 23 remains the appropriate analytical framework for class certification questions. We now turn to the issue of whether the district court properly applied Rule 23‘s certification requirements to the facts of this case.
“In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.” Anderson v. City of Albuquerque, 690 F.2d 796, 799 (10th Cir.1982) (quotation omitted); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) (“[N]othing in either the language or history of Rule 23 gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.“). Although “the class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff‘s cause of action,” the court‘s responsibility is to “carefully apply the requirements of
Thus, the court‘s first inquiry is whether the plaintiff can show the existence of the four threshold requirements of Rule 23(a). Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 675 (10th Cir.1988). Specifically, the court must decide if
- (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
If the court finds that the plaintiffs have met these threshold requirements, “it must then examine whether the action falls within one of three categories of suits set forth in Rule 23(b).” Adamson, 855 F.2d at 675. In this case, the plaintiffs sought to certify the class action under
According to the prisoners, the problem with the court‘s order is that it does not square its concerns about the relief they seek with the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2). They argue that by conducting a review of whether the plaintiffs’ requested relief was constitutionally required, the
In defense of the court‘s methodology, El Paso argues that the decision to certify a class “involves intensely practical considerations” and that therefore the district court properly examined the additional considerations in its order denying class certification. Reed v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir.1988). Additionally, El Paso maintains that denial was proper under Rule 23 because the court‘s ruling is best read as concluding that (1) the complaint could not meet the commonality, typicality, and representational requirements of Rule 23(a) and (2) the plaintiffs’ claims were too dissimilar to satisfy
Specifically with respect to Rule 23, El Paso argues that the prisoners’ individual claims are too varied to meet the commonality and typicality requirements because each prisoner‘s claim requires a particularized analysis on the merits. El Paso claims that these failings in commonality and typicality make the prisoners inadequate class representatives. Finally, El Paso argues that the dissimilarities among the prisoners’ claims—i.e., their varied mental health problems and potential remedies for those problems—make final injunctive relief inappropriate under
On this record and at this stage in the litigation, we agree with the prisoners. The district court erred by not specifically addressing the traditional Rule 23 factors in denying class certification. See J.B., 186 F.3d at 1287. Its order instead prematurely focused on whether the court could ultimately fashion a remedy that satisfied the strictures of
Two additional considerations bear on the district court‘s application of Rule 23. The prisoners contend that by looking at the merits of their claim, the district court appears to have imported additional elements from
Regarding identifiability, the district court‘s order specifically states that “[t]he initial problem in this case is the identification of members of the class.” Shook, 216 F.R.D. at 647-48. However, while the lack of identifiability is a factor that may defeat
The district court also looked to a manageability requirement in applying
According to the Fifth Circuit, however, in Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 994 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir.1993), “questions of manageability and judicial economy are ... irrelevant to
We agree with the Lowery court. Elements of manageability and efficiency are not categorically precluded in determining whether to certify a
Notwithstanding our holding that manageability is not categorically barred in
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that the PLRA does not add new elements to the class certification analysis. Rather, because the district court erred by denying class certification relief without addressing Rule 23(a)‘s threshold requirements or assessing
TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I readily join the majority‘s opinion, with one exception. The majority holds that manageability is a proper criterion for courts to consider when certifying
First, I find that circuit precedent bars this holding. We previously addressed whether a district court could rely upon a criterion listed under
Second, even if circuit precedent did not govern this issue, I find that the standard rules of statutory construction lead to a result contrary to that reached by the majority.
The majority counters that
I find, therefore, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ approach more persuasive. See Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 994 F.2d 1101, 1105 (5th Cir.1993) (“questions of manageability and judicial economy are ... irrelevant to