Nono v. the George Washington University
245 F. Supp. 3d 141
D.D.C.2017Background
- Nono, a Black native of Cameroon and former GWU Police Department security officer, worked at GWU from 2005 until suspension (April 2012) and termination (May 1, 2013) after a DWI charge and loss of his security license.
- He surrendered his security license and was suspended pending investigation; later received a probation-before-judgment and unsupervised probation in Maryland.
- GWUPD required a new SOMB security license for reinstatement; SOMB initially denied his application but later (post-termination) the denial was overturned and the license reinstated on appeal.
- Nono reapplied and was interviewed in October 2013 but not rehired; he filed an EEOC charge on October 7, 2014 and sued in March 2016 alleging racial and national-origin discrimination (Title VII and § 1981), promissory estoppel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- GWU moved to partially dismiss; the court dismissed or limited claims based on timeliness, inadequacy of pleading, federal preemption, and failure to state IIED.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of Title VII claim about termination | Nono argued his administrative charge was timely as to the last discriminatory act and requested equitable tolling due to GWU conduct | GWU argued the termination claim is time-barred because the EEOC charge was filed more than 300 days after termination and equitable tolling is unwarranted | Dismissed: termination-based Title VII claim untimely; equitable tolling denied |
| Scope of § 1981 claims | Nono pleaded § 1981 claims for termination and failure to rehire | GWU noted § 1981 does not cover national-origin discrimination | Court limited § 1981 to racial-discrimination theory only (no national-origin protection) |
| Failure-to-rehire discrimination theories | Nono alleged GWU hired less-qualified and U.S.-born (non–Cameroonian) employees, implying race and national-origin motives | GWU argued pleadings lack factual allegations of racial animus; hiring of a U.S.-born employee supports national-origin claim only | Partly dismissed: racial-failure-to-rehire claim dismissed; Title VII national-origin failure-to-rehire claim may proceed |
| Promissory estoppel (state law) | Nono claimed GWU promised not to terminate until SOMB adjudication; he relied and was harmed | GWU argued resolution of the claim requires interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) | Dismissed: promissory estoppel preempted by LMRA § 301 because resolution depends on CBA interpretation |
| IIED claim | Nono alleged suspension, confiscation of license/keys, barring from campus, and termination were extreme and outrageous | GWU argued these actions are ordinary employment decisions not meeting IIED standard | Dismissed: allegations insufficient to show extreme/outrageous conduct or severe emotional distress |
| Leave to amend | Nono requested leave to amend in opposition brief | GWU opposed; court noted procedural defects and absence of proposed amended complaint | Denied: plaintiff failed to follow local rules and amendment would be futile |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading must contain sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for complaints)
- Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (discrete acts must be timely themselves for Title VII)
- Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (§ 1981 protects against racial, not national-origin, discrimination)
- Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575 (equitable tolling permitted only in extraordinary circumstances)
- Dyson v. D.C., 710 F.3d 415 (equitable tolling requires diligence plus extraordinary obstacle)
- Lingle v. Norgle Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (LMRA § 301 preempts state-law claims that require CBA interpretation)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (state-law claims substantially dependent on a collective-bargaining agreement are preempted)
- Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (district court need not accept fanciful or legally deficient claims)
- Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (standards for granting leave to amend)
- Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052 (court may consider complaint, attachments, and matters of judicial notice on motion to dismiss)
- Newmyer v. Sidwell Friends Sch., 128 A.3d 1023 (D.C. IIED standard: extreme/outrageous conduct causing severe distress)