Nolan v. Shulman, Rogers, Gandal, Pordy & Ecker, P.A.
270 F. Supp. 3d 167
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Nolan (pro se) obtained a 2005 mortgage from HSBC on D.C. property; Fannie Mae later became the note holder.
- Nolan previously sued HSBC and Fannie Mae in a related federal case (Nolan I), which was removed and later dismissed for failure to respond to dismissal motions.
- Fannie Mae filed a foreclosure action in D.C. Superior Court; a default judgment entered but Nolan later obtained relief and the foreclosure remains pending with mediation scheduled.
- Nolan filed the instant complaint naming HSBC, Shulman Rogers (HSBC’s prior counsel), Fannie Mae, and McGuireWoods (Fannie Mae’s prior counsel), seeking damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, discharge/refund of loan payments, and to void the foreclosure.
- Defendants moved to dismiss. Nolan filed limited responses; the court struck an unauthorized supplemental filing and found many claims conclusory or improper for federal court intervention.
- The court GRANTED defendants’ motions to dismiss and DENIED Nolan’s request to enjoin or consolidate Nolan I.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether this court has jurisdiction over Nolan I and may consolidate/enjoin it | Nolan sought to enjoin/consolidate Nolan I into this action | Defendants argued removal basis (12 U.S.C. §1723a) does not create jurisdiction post-Lightfoot; Nolan I was dismissed | Court: No jurisdiction under Lightfoot; Nolan I dismissed and Rule 60(b) relief not shown, so request denied |
| Whether Rule 60(b) relief is warranted to reopen Nolan I (fraud on the court) | Nolan alleges fraud and false documents by opposing counsel | Defendants: allegations are vague, lack specifics and do not meet fraud-on-the-court standard | Court: Allegations insufficient; Rule 60(b) relief denied |
| Whether McGuireWoods should remain as a defendant despite lack of factual allegations | Nolan named McGuireWoods in caption but pleaded no facts about it | McGuireWoods: Complaint fails Rule 8(a) notice pleading standards | Court: Dismiss McGuireWoods for failure to plead facts against it |
| Whether federal court should decide claims that challenge an ongoing state foreclosure | Nolan challenges validity of foreclosure and related conduct in federal court | Defendants: abstain under Younger because state foreclosure is ongoing and adequate forum exists in Superior Court | Court: Applied Younger three-prong test and dismissed claims related to foreclosure; abstention appropriate |
| Whether the “note splitting” argument (separation of note and deed) invalidates foreclosure | Nolan contends transfer of note to Fannie Mae split note from deed, rendering note unenforceable | Defendants: argument is meritless and can be raised in Superior Court | Court: Rejected splitting theory (joins prior decisions) and held abstention appropriate to let state court address it |
Key Cases Cited
- Araya v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 775 F.3d 409 (D.C. Cir.) (discussing jurisdictional issues in Fannie Mae cases)
- Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Tr. v. Raines, 534 F.3d 779 (D.C. Cir.) (prior D.C. Circuit treatment of Fannie Mae jurisdiction)
- Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S. Ct. 553 (2017) (Supreme Court: §1723a(a) does not independently confer federal subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal courts should generally abstain from enjoining ongoing state judicial proceedings)
- Worldwide Moving & Storage, Inc. v. D.C., 445 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir.) (articulates three-prong Younger abstention test)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard requires sufficient factual matter to state a claim)
- Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (pro se complaints are construed liberally)
- Fontaine v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 42 F. Supp. 3d 102 (D.D.C.) (rejecting the note/deed "splitting" theory)
- Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 968 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C.) (fraud-on-the-court standard)