335 F.Supp.3d 504
S.D.N.Y.2018Background
- Plaintiff Kadian Noble, an aspiring actress, alleges that in May 2014 Harvey Weinstein enticed her to his Cannes hotel room by promising a film role and modeling opportunities, then forcibly sexually assaulted her (groping, forced masturbation, ejaculation).
- Noble alleges Harvey used promises (fraud) plus physical force to cause her to engage in a "commercial sex act" and that she reasonably relied on his promises because of his industry power.
- Noble sued under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (sex trafficking) with a civil remedy via § 1595; claims were brought against Harvey, The Weinstein Company, and Robert Weinstein (Harvey’s co‑founder).
- Harvey moved to dismiss Count I (§ 1591) arguing the conduct is not sex trafficking because there was no commercial sex act or anything of value exchanged; Robert moved to dismiss Counts III and V (venture participation and aiding/abetting) arguing lack of participation/knowledge and that § 1595 does not create aider/abettor liability.
- The Court denied Harvey’s motion, holding Noble plausibly pleaded (1) enticement/recruitment by fraud, (2) knowledge that force/fraud would be used, and (3) a commercial sex act (interpreting “anything of value” broadly to include career opportunities). The Court granted Robert’s motion, finding insufficient factual allegations tying him to participation or substantial assistance in Harvey’s alleged § 1591 violation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Weinstein’s conduct can constitute a § 1591 violation | Noble: Harvey recruited/enticed her by promising career opportunities (value) and used fraud and force to cause a sex act | Harvey: Not sex trafficking — no commercial exchange or economic component; would overbroadly federalize ordinary sexual misconduct | Held: Denied as to Harvey — pleaded enticement, knowledge that force/fraud would be used, and a commercial sex act (broad reading of "anything of value") |
| Whether the misrepresentations were material and causally linked to the sex act | Noble: Promises were material to an aspiring actress and induced her to go to the room and partially comply | Harvey: Promises vague/indefinite; incidental to sexual encounter, not causally operative | Held: Court found statements plausible, material, reasonably relied upon, and causally related to the sex act |
| Whether the sexual conduct qualifies as a "commercial sex act" under § 1591(e)(3) | Noble: "Anything of value" includes non‑monetary career opportunity (casting/model meeting); "any sex act" is broad and includes forced masturbation | Harvey: "Commercial" requires an economic component; § 2246 definitions ought to limit "sex act" | Held: Court adopts broad statutory reading; career opportunities constitute "value," and the alleged acts qualify as "any sex act," satisfying the commercial element |
| Whether Robert Weinstein is liable under § 1591(a)(2) / via aiding and abetting under § 1595 | Noble: Robert benefitted from and facilitated Harvey’s international business and used NDAs to silence victims; thus he knowingly participated/assisted | Robert: Mere corporate role, payments for business travel or settlements, or passive benefit insufficient; § 1595 does not permit aider/abettor liability absent clear statutory text | Held: Granted as to Robert — allegations too conclusory; no specific facts that he participated in or substantially assisted Harvey’s alleged § 1591 conduct; aiding/abetting civil liability not established under § 1595 |
Key Cases Cited
- Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2012) (pleading standard — treat allegations as true on Rule 12(b)(6))
- Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (remedial statutes should be liberally construed)
- N.C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1973) (remedial statutes construed broadly)
- Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (judicial reluctance to narrow remedial private causes of action)
- United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 2013) (statutory language "any" and "whoever" supports broad interpretation of § 1591)
- United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 2010) (knowledge at recruitment stage that force/fraud will be used satisfies § 1591)
- Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2012) (statutory interpretation begins with plain meaning and context)
- Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (undefined statutory words are given their ordinary meaning)
- Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (no presumption of private aiding and abetting liability when statute provides a private right of action)