Noble v. Harvey Weinstein, Robert Weinstein, the Weinstein Co.
335 F. Supp. 3d 504
| S.D. Ill. | 2018Background
- In 2014 in Cannes, plaintiff Kadian Noble alleges Harvey Weinstein lured her with promises of a film role and modeling opportunities, then assaulted and forced sexual acts in his hotel room and bathroom.
- Noble alleges Harvey used both fraudulent promises and physical force; she claims reliance on his industry influence and that no promised career benefits materialized.
- Noble sued under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. § 1591, with a civil remedy under § 1595; complaint included counts against Harvey, The Weinstein Company, and Robert Weinstein.
- Harvey moved to dismiss Count I (§ 1591); Robert moved to dismiss counts alleging participation in a trafficking venture and aiding-and-abetting (§§ 1591(a)(2) / § 1595 theories).
- The court assumed the Amended Complaint facts true for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes and denied Harvey’s motion, finding the complaint plausibly alleged enticement, knowledge of force/fraud, and a commercial sex act; it granted Robert’s motions dismissing claims against him.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1591 applies to Weinstein’s conduct | Noble: Harvey enticed her with promises of career opportunities, knowing he would use force/fraud to obtain sex, satisfying § 1591 elements | Harvey: § 1591 is aimed at traditional trafficking; this conduct is private sexual assault absent a commercial exchange or economic element | Court: Denied dismissal — allegations plausibly plead enticement, knowledge that force/fraud would be used, and a “commercial sex act” because promised career benefits constitute "anything of value." |
| Whether the statutory verb ("entice/recruit") is plausibly alleged | Noble: Harvey’s promises, recruitment, interviews, and review of reel show enticement | Harvey: Promises were vague/indefinite and not economic | Court: ‘‘Entice’’ construed by its ordinary meaning; factual context (promises, meetings, reliance) plausibly alleges enticement. |
| Whether the complaint plausibly alleges knowledge that force, fraud, or coercion would be used | Noble: pattern of promises that were false and contextual behavior show awareness that fraud/force would be employed | Harvey: No such mens rea at recruitment; this would overbroadly federalize private misconduct | Court: Allegations that Harvey promised roles, made assistants contact her, then used force, and never performed on promises, plausibly allege knowledge/reckless disregard. |
| Whether Robert Weinstein can be liable for (a) participating in a § 1591 venture or (b) aiding-and-abetting under § 1595 | Noble: Robert benefited from and facilitated Harvey’s conduct through company support, travel financing, and use of NDAs to silence victims | Robert: Ownership/management and general business support do not show knowing participation, direct assistance, or substantial assistance for the specific 2014 act | Court: Dismissed claims against Robert — pleading lacked factual allegations tying Robert to or showing knowledge/substantial assistance in the Cannes incident; aiding-and-abetting liability not properly asserted under § 1595 absent clear statutory basis and facts. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard: plausibility required)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility and "enough heft" in pleadings)
- Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (remedial statutes construed broadly)
- BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176 (plain text controls when unambiguous)
- Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (the word "any" is expansive)
- United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066 (broad statutory language in § 1591 reaches varied conduct)
- United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329 (knowledge-of-means requirement under § 1591)
- United States v. Maynes, 880 F.3d 110 (fraud must be used "to cause" the sex act; statute complete where enticement established)
- Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (no implied private aiding-and-abetting cause of action)
- Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314 (secondary civil liability requires text or clear support)
- Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (substantial-assistance standard for aiding-and-abetting)