Ninestar Corp. v. United States, 2023 CIT 169

Plaintiffs Ninestar Corporation and several Chinese corporate affiliates were added to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List in June 2023; the Listing presumes imports by listed entities are prohibited under 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (section 307).
UFLPA directs the interagency Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF) to maintain the Entity List and requires U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to apply a rebuttable presumption that goods from listed entities are not entitled to entry.
Plaintiffs sued in the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) and moved for a preliminary injunction to stay the Listing and bar enforcement actions premised on it, alleging arbitrary and capricious agency action under the APA.
Defendants argued the CIT lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) because the Listing does not create an "embargo" or quantitative restriction—CBP enforcement decisions occur later and are rebuttable.
The court limited its review to jurisdiction and held Plaintiffs are likely to establish that the UFLPA is a law "providing for . . . embargoes" within § 1581(i), so challenges to agency action implementing the UFLPA fall within the CIT’s exclusive jurisdiction; the court made no merits findings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the UFLPA Listing Decision falls within CIT exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (embargoes)	UFLPA creates a congressionally mandated prohibition on importation for listed entities (a zero-quantity restriction), so the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction.	The Listing is only a rebuttable presumption and does not itself impose a quantitative embargo; any exclusion would be a later CBP decision.	Court: UFLPA’s statutory presumption operates as an embargo under K Mart’s definition; Plaintiffs likely can establish § 1581(i) jurisdiction.
Whether the CIT’s § 1581(i)(1)(D) jurisdiction over "administration and enforcement" covers UFLPA challenges	UFLPA is enacted to strengthen enforcement of section 307 and therefore falls within administration/enforcement jurisdiction.	(Implicit) If Listing is not an embargo, § 1581(i)(D) may not apply.	Court: Even if one insisted the Listing is merely a presumption, § 1581(i)(D) covers administration and enforcement tied to section 307, so CIT jurisdiction is proper.

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (U.S. 2008) (preliminary injunction standard)
K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176 (U.S. 1988) (defines an embargo as a government-imposed zero quantitative restriction)
U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 413 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (court should consider jurisdiction before merits on preliminary relief)
Conoco, Inc. v. U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 18 F.3d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (CIT expertise and consolidation rationale for exclusive jurisdiction)
Int'l Lab. Rts. Fund v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (D.D.C. 2005) (forced-labor/import prohibition cases within embargo/jurisdictional framework)
McKinney v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 799 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (forced-labor enforcement and CIT jurisdictional precedent)
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (U.S. 1994) (federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction)