Tawin SPENCE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
No. PD-1458-09.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Sept. 15, 2010.
Scheller is entitled to mandamus relief because the trial court abused its discretion in issuing temporary orders for grandparent access. Pemberton did not meet the burden required to divest a parent of control and autonomy in making parenting decisions. This is irremediable error that warrants mandamus relief. See Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d at 334-35. However, the trial court did not err in appointing an expert to serve as guardian ad litem to the children and as a psychologist to evaluate the case and make recommendations to the court regarding the children‘s best interests. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the trial court to lift the temporary order permitting grandparent access. See
Jeffrey S. Ford, Asst. Crim. D.A., Lubbock, Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State‘s Attorney, Austin, for State.
OPINION
COCHRAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KELLER, P.J., PRICE, WOMACK, JOHNSON, KEASLER, and HOLCOMB, JJ., joined.
We granted review to resolve a conflict between courts of appeals regarding whether a license plate must be displayed
I.
A. Background Facts.
Appellant was charged with possession of cocaine that Lubbock Police Officer Shane Bledsoe found during a pat-down search for weapons after he stopped appellant for traffic violations.
Around 1:00 a.m. on September 23, 2006, Officer Bledsoe saw a Chevrolet Impala with “blue sparkle paint with white racing stripes and large wheels” parked in the driveway of a known drug house. The officer circled the block, and, as he approached the house a second time, he saw the Impala backing out. As Officer Bledsoe drove past the Impala, he saw that there was no front license plate on it. The Impala “had a silver chrome looking decorative plate on the front, it didn‘t have a license plate on the front.” The officer testified that he pulled appellant over for the license plate violation and for illegally parking in the driveway by blocking the sidewalk.
Officer Bledsoe said that, as he “approached the vehicle, [he] observed the (license) plate sitting in the windshield.” Before the officer could explain the reason for the traffic stop, appellant told Officer Bledsoe that “he already knew why, for the license plate, and advised me that he had just gotten a ticket ... for the same violation.” Because appellant could not produce a driver‘s license, Officer Bledsoe asked him to step out of the car while he checked appellant‘s license for warrants. While doing a routine pat-down search, the officer felt a bulge, which he believed to be drugs, in the space between appellant‘s crotch and belt. He placed
Appellant testified at trial and disputed the vehicle violations. Appellant denied parking on the sidewalk and explained that “my car was parked right behind [the homeowner‘s car], so there would be no reason for me to be out here where I would have to obstruct the sidewalk in any kind of way.” Appellant stated that his front license plate was “all the way up in front of the front windshield” and, in his opinion, it was very visible from the street. He also confirmed his initial conversation with Officer Bledsoe. “As soon as he had came to the car, I told him—because I thought that‘s what he had pulled me over for, for the license plates ... I let him know ... the license plate is right here ... up in the window.”
At the close of evidence, appellant‘s counsel objected to the jury charge and provided two proposed instructions: First, he requested that the jury be instructed that “it is not a violation of [
The jury found appellant guilty of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance weighing between 200 and 400 grams. Appellant pled true to a previous drug conviction, and the trial judge sentenced him to 60 years in prison.
B. The Court of Appeals Decision.
On appeal, appellant argued that the trial court erred in denying his article 38.23 jury instruction. Relying on State v. Losoya,7 he argued that, by testifying at trial that his license plate was clearly visible through the windshield, he raised a disputed fact issue entitling him to the 38.23 instruction. In Losoya, the Austin court held that wedging a license plate between the dashboard and the windshield “is not inconsistent with the language or purpose of”
The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that
II.
The question before this Court is one of statutory construction concerning
A person commits an offense if the per-son operates on a public highway during a registration period a passenger car or commercial motor vehicle that does not display two license plates, at the front and rear of the vehicle.
Specifically, does the text “at the front ... of the vehicle” permit a license plate to be displayed anywhere in the front half of the car or truck or only at its foremost part?
A. Statutory Construction.
Statutory construction is a ques-tion of law; therefore our review is de novo.14 As we recently stated in Mahaf-fey, in interpreting statutes, we focus on the literal text to determine the objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment.15 We follow this principle be-cause (1) “the text of the statute is the law“; (2) “the text is the only definitive evidence of what the legislators ... had in mind when the state was enacted into law“; and (3) “the legislature is constitu-tionally entitled to expect that the judicia-ry will faithfully follow the specific text that was adopted.”16 Therefore, “if the meaning of the statutory text ... should have been plain to the legislators who vot-ed on it, we ordinarily give effect to that plain meaning.”17 We depart from this plain-meaning rule only when “application of a statute‘s plain language would lead to absurd consequences” or “the language is not plain but rather ambiguous.”18
B. Under the Plain Language of Sec-tion 502.404(a) of the Texas Trans-portation Code, a License Plate must Be Displayed at the Beginning or Foremost Part of a Vehicle, Most Commonly the Front Bumper.
The plain language of
Furthermore, this plain-language con-struction does not lead to absurd results but rather accomplishes the purpose of the statute. We think that the purpose of
Appellant argues, consistent with State v. Losoya,22 that the word “front” in
Appellant also argues, relying on the legislative analysis found in Losoya,24 that because the current statute omits the phrase “and attached thereto” found in the predecessor to
Finally, even if the word “front” were ambiguous, the Austin court‘s inter-pretation in Losoya conflicts with the pur-pose of the statute. In Losoya the court stated, and we agree, that “[t]he apparent purpose of section 502.404(a) is to facilitate the identification of a motor vehicle by its license plate number whether it is moving toward or away from the viewer.”30 Al-lowing the plate to be located in a number of different places would make it difficult to quickly determine whether a given car has a license plate or what its numbers are. Furthermore, reflected sunlight or the lack of light at nighttime would further impede one‘s ability to find the location and content of a license plate placed under the windshield. These difficulties would result in far more unnecessary traffic stops.31 The purpose of
III.
A. Appellant‘s Placement of His Li-cense Plate Did Not Comply with Section 502.404(a) .
Appellant‘s brief restates his trial testimony that the license plate was “propped up inside, up in the window on the glass, so it was all the way up in front of the front windshield.”32 Officer Bled-soe‘s testimony that there was no license plate attached to the front bumper and that he saw the plate behind the wind-shield only when he walked up to the car also confirms the location of the plate. On appeal, the Amarillo Court observed that while “all agree on the plate‘s location ... [a] question arises, however, as to whether that was a permissible location.”33 The Court of Appeals held that, because
B. Appellant Was Not Entitled to an Article 38.23 Jury Instruction.
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in not giving an
Under the plain language of the Texas Transportation Code, a license plate must be displayed at the foremost part or begin-ning of a vehicle, most commonly the front bumper. The word “front” in
MEYERS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which HERVEY, J., joined.
MEYERS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which HERVEY, J., joined.
A person commits an offense if the per-son operates on a public highway during a registration period a passenger car or commercial motor vehicle that does not display two license plates, at the front and rear of the vehicle, that have been:
(1) assigned by the department for the period; or
(2) validated by a registration insignia issued by the department that estab-lishes that the vehicle is registered for the period.
The only thing about this statute that is clear is that it is not well written.
The court of appeals in this case held that “one complies with § 502.404 of the Transportation Code when the license is affixed somewhere in the foremost or be-ginning area of the car.” Spence v. State, 296 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2009). The majority agrees and concludes that “the plain language of
I agree with State v. Losoya that, “While a place to display the license plate is usually found on the front bumper, the statute does not expressly require the use of this location. The display of the plate in some other place or manner is not incon-sistent with the language or purpose of the statute.” 128 S.W.3d 413, 416 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref‘d).
The court of appeals asserts that placing the license plate in the front windshield makes it “much harder” for police “to fo-cus on several areas (as opposed to one) when a car drives past at traveling speeds.” Spence, 296 S.W.3d at 318. But officers must look at the front windshield anyway to see if the license plates that are displayed have a valid registration.1 I re-alize that the officer in this case testified that an alternative reason he pulled Appel-lant over was that when the car was parked in the driveway it was blocking the sidewalk. But this was just a parking violation, which goes to the car, not to the driver. If the officer so desired, he could have written a parking ticket and placed it under the windshield wiper of the illegally parked car, at which time he would have clearly seen the license plate displayed in the front windshield.
CONCLUSION
Using the majority‘s logic, the rear of the vehicle would be the back bumper. But as we all know, 90% of all vehicles do not display the license plate on the back bumper, they are usually on the tailgate or trunk. I would construe front and rear to mean any surface facing that direction. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Notes
Appellant‘s grounds for review read as follows:
1. Does the Amarillo Court of Appeals’ decision in the petitioner‘s case conflict with the Austin Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Losoya concerning the same issue, to wit: the legally permissible location to display a vehicle‘s license plate?
2. Has the Amarillo Court of Appeals decided an important question of state law concerning the legislative intent of the term “front” and the permissible location of a vehicle‘s license plate as provided by
3. Has the Amarillo Court of Appeals departed from the usual course of judicial review where it has not addressed or rendered an opinion on petitioner‘s original complaint on appeal, to wit: the trial court‘s error in failing to give 38.23 instructions in the charge?
Registration stickers used to be displayed on the license plate but are now displayed inside the front windshield.
