Nieves v. Commissioner of Correction
152 A.3d 570
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- Petitioner Angel Nieves was convicted after a 2005 jury trial of murder and firearm offenses for a 2002 shooting; conviction and sentence (68 years) were affirmed on direct appeal.
- Maria Quinones, a non-testifying witness, gave an initial out-of-court description of the shooter that included distinctive neck tattoos; she later gave a statement to police identifying Nieves as the shooter.
- Trial counsel did not introduce Quinones’ first statement (the neck-tattoo description) at trial; the state presented multiple eyewitnesses who identified Nieves and testified to similar physical descriptions.
- Petitioner filed an amended habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to admit Quinones’ exculpatory statement (arguing it fit the spontaneous/excited utterance hearsay exception).
- The habeas court found counsel’s choice was a reasonable strategic decision (concerned the state would introduce Quinones’ later identification) and that the petitioner failed the performance prong of Strickland; the court denied habeas relief and this ruling was affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective for not offering Quinones’ neck-tattoo statement | Nieves: counsel erred by failing to present an exculpatory spontaneous utterance | State: counsel reasonably chose not to offer it because it risked presentation of a later, damaging identification | Counsel’s decision was reasonable trial strategy; performance prong not met |
| Admissibility under spontaneous/excited-utterance exception | Nieves: Quinones’ initial statement was excited and contemporaneous, thus admissible | State: timing and circumstances may not negate opportunity for fabrication; admissibility uncertain | Court need not decide admissibility because counsel’s strategic choice was reasonable |
| Prejudice from counsel’s omission (Strickland prejudice prong) | Nieves: introduction would likely have undermined state’s case | State: strong eyewitness identification evidence and risk of later identification would negate reasonable probability of different outcome | Court declined to reach prejudice because performance prong failed; record supports no reasonable probability of different result |
| Whether the state could have been precluded from using Quinones’ later ID due to sequestration violation | Nieves: sequestration violation would have barred later testimony/identification | State: exclusion is discretionary and not the preferred remedy; other avenues could admit the later ID | Court found exclusion unlikely to be the sole outcome; state could likely admit the later identification |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-pronged test for ineffective assistance: performance and prejudice)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice analysis in plea/ineffective-assistance context)
- Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, 306 Conn. 664 (2012) (deference to counsel’s strategic decisions about calling witnesses)
- Spearman v. Commissioner of Correction, 164 Conn. App. 530 (2016) (standards for reviewing ineffective-assistance claims)
- State v. Kendall, 123 Conn. App. 625 (2010) (elements of the excited-utterance hearsay exception)
- Chace v. Bronson, 19 Conn. App. 674 (1989) (presentation of testimonial evidence is trial strategy)
- State v. Dunbar, 51 Conn. App. 313 (1998) (trial court discretion on admissibility reviewed for abuse)