849 F.3d 1191
9th Cir.2017Background
- Pretrial detainee Nick Mangiaracina alleged multiple instances (nine described) of legal mail to/from his attorneys being opened before delivery to him at Maricopa County’s Fourth Avenue Jail, contrary to the jail rule requiring legal mail be opened only in the inmate’s presence.
- Mangiaracina attached grievance responses for two incidents (Nov. 9, 2012 and Mar. 12, 2013) in which jail records indicated the envelopes arrived sealed but were delivered to him opened and resealed; the facility’s mailroom responses characterized the items as legal mail.
- He alleged prejudice: fear of communicating by mail with counsel because confidentiality was violated, and interference with defense preparation across multiple pending criminal matters.
- District court dismissed the third amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state First and Sixth Amendment claims, reasoning many incidents lacked allegations that the mail was clearly marked legal mail or opened outside his presence; Mangiaracina appealed.
- Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo, construing pro se pleadings liberally, and considered the relevance of earlier Ninth Circuit precedent (Nordstrom) and the jail’s written policy (judicially noticed) requiring in-person opening of legal mail.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sixth Amendment: right to confidential communication with counsel; presence when legal mail inspected | Mangiaracina: jail opened properly marked legal mail outside his presence, chilling counsel communications and harming defense | Defendants: incidents were isolated/accidental; plaintiff cannot know if mail was read; lack of allegation that mail was marked legal | Reversed in part: two incidents (Nov. 9, 2012; Mar. 12, 2013) sufficiently plead Sixth Amendment claims; other counts dismissed for failure to allege legal-mail marking |
| First Amendment: right to confidential legal mail and chilling effect | Mangiaracina: opening attorney mail outside his presence chilled protected expression and access to court | Defendants: deviations were isolated/accidental and not a constitutional violation | Reversed in part and remanded in light of Hayes: First Amendment claim survives for the two incidents; remaining counts dismissed |
| Pleading standard for §1983 (intent vs negligence) | Mangiaracina: alleged repeated openings and statements by staff suggesting permissive practice (supports intentional or systematic conduct) | Defendants: argued lack of proof they read mail and characterized incidents as accidental | Concurrence (Bybee J.): §1983 requires deliberate (intentional or reckless) conduct; negligent opening alone does not state a claim—but the complaint here alleges facts (staff statements, repeated incidents) sufficient at pleading stage to infer intentional course of conduct for the two counts |
| Isolated incidents vs pattern/practice sufficiency | Mangiaracina: even isolated incidents can suffice (Nordstrom) given circumstances | Defendants: one or two stray incidents are insufficient | Court: isolated incidents may suffice in appropriate circumstances; here two incidents plus grievance responses and alleged staff statements suffice to survive dismissal for those counts |
Key Cases Cited
- Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (requiring inmates be present when legal mail is inspected to prevent officials from reading attorney correspondence)
- Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.) (holding improper reading/opening of legal mail can violate Sixth Amendment; single egregious incident may suffice)
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (deference to penological interests; restrictions valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives)
- Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353 (3d Cir.) (opening legal mail outside inmate’s presence deprives confidentiality and chills protected expression)
- Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868 (6th Cir.) (recognizing constitutional protection for attorney mail opened only in inmate’s presence)
- Merriweather v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307 (6th Cir.) (finding multiple improper openings support constitutional claim)