567 S.W.3d 718
Tex.2019Background
- Nghiem and Sajib were passengers when Nghiem's small plane crashed after recent repairs; both were injured and the plane was destroyed.
- Global Aviation had serviced and repaired the plane shortly before the crash; Sajib sued Global for negligence and obtained a verdict.
- Nghiem sought to intervene after the two-year limitations period, initially asserting negligence and later adding a breach of implied warranty of good and workmanlike repair.
- Global moved to strike Nghiem’s intervention, arguing both claims were time-barred and that the implied-warranty claim is actionable only under the DTPA with its two-year statute.
- The trial court struck Nghiem’s petition; the court of appeals affirmed, following precedent that treated the Melody Home implied warranty as DTPA-only.
- The Texas Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the implied warranty recognized in Melody Home is limited to the DTPA or also available at common law, and whether the DTPA limitations period applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Melody Home implied warranty is actionable at common law or only under the DTPA | Nghiem: implied warranty exists at common law and thus can be sued on outside the DTPA | Global: Melody Home warranty is actionable only under the DTPA | The implied warranty is a common-law cause of action as well as actionable under the DTPA; cases holding otherwise are disapproved |
| Whether the DTPA two-year limitations period governs Nghiem's implied-warranty claim | Nghiem: his claim is common-law (contract/tort hybrid) and not governed by the DTPA limitations; four-year residual may apply | Global: DTPA governs, so two-year limitations bar the claim | Because the claim was brought under common law, the DTPA limitations period does not apply; trial court abused discretion in striking the intervention (court did not decide which non-DTPA limitations period applies) |
| Whether an intervenor must rebut all defenses beyond the motion to strike when intervening | Nghiem: intervenor need only respond to grounds stated in the motion to strike | Global: contended limitations barred intervention | Party opposing intervention bears initial burden to move to strike; intervenor must rebut the grounds raised — here Nghiem met that burden on the DTPA-limitations point |
| Whether the court should resolve which non-DTPA statute of limitations applies on this record | Nghiem: residual four-year statute presumed applicable | Global: argued tort roots to support DTPA limitations | Court: did not decide which non-DTPA limitations period applies; remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987) (recognized implied warranty of workmanlike repairs in the context of the DTPA)
- La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1984) (implied warranties generally derive from statute or common law; DTPA does not itself create warranties)
- Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968) (recognized implied warranties for new-home construction; discussed tort vs. contract grounding)
- Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Bell, 422 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. 1968) (held an implied warranty arising from a contract is governed by contract limitations)
- Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1988) (applied four-year contract limitations to Melody Home implied-warranty claim and treated it as arising from contract)