Newland v. Commissioner of Correction, 142 A.3d 1095

Background

Petitioner Gene Newland, low-wage worker with a mortgaged residence (limited equity), was twice denied public defender representation by the Danielson office despite claiming he could not afford private counsel.
The public defender office denied services based on his ownership of real property; there was no evidence the modest equity was accessible while the mortgage was in default.
Over ~2 years Newland repeatedly told the trial court he could not find private counsel; the trial court treated his inability to retain counsel as an "implied waiver" and required him to proceed pro se on serious sexual-assault charges.
On habeas review the court considered (and the Appellate Court agreed) that the underlying problem was public defender error (erroneous eligibility determinations), not solely trial-court waiver procedures.
The dissent (McDonald, J.) argues the habeas court properly considered public defender error, that procedural-default prejudice should be presumed for denial-of-counsel claims, and that the habeas court’s factual findings (crediting petitioner testimony and public defender policy testimony) support relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Newland)	Defendant's Argument (Commissioner)	Held
Was public defender error a proper basis for habeas relief though petition pleaded trial-court error?	Petition and submissions put respondent on notice; public defender error was subsumed in trial-waiver claim and supported by record.	Claim not pleaded; consideration of new claim prejudices respondent and should be barred.	Habeas court may consider public defender error here; respondent had notice and was not prejudiced. (Dissent: yes)
Is a procedurally defaulted denial-of-counsel claim barred absent cause and prejudice?	Prejudice from denial of counsel is legally presumed; that presumption should apply in procedural-default inquiry.	Petitioner must show cause and actual prejudice; presumption in merits does not automatically apply to procedural-default inquiry.	Dissent: Presumption of prejudice applies to procedural-default analysis for denial-of-counsel claims, excusing default.
Did petitioner prove public defender error on the merits?	Credible evidence showed income eligibility, lack of accessible assets (equity effectively inaccessible), and public defender policy would not treat foreclosure-encumbered equity as disqualifying.	Petitioner failed to produce the original public-defender applications and did not prove income or the applicable guideline levels for 2007–2008.	Dissent: Habeas court's credibility findings and inferences supported finding of public defender error; not clearly erroneous.
Should courts adopt prophylactic procedures when a defendant claims inability to afford counsel but is denied public defender services?	Yes — require public defender to appear, advise defendant of §51-297(g) right to appeal, and require judicial inquiry into ability to retain counsel before trying a defendant unrepresented.	Not directly addressed by Commissioner in dissent; existing procedures and case law permit reliance on public defender determination.	Dissent: Supervisory rule should be adopted to ensure hearings and judicial review before trying unrepresented defendants.

Key Cases Cited

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants)
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (importance of counsel at critical stages)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard; discussion of presumed prejudice when counsel denied)
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (structural-error presumption when counsel is completely denied or critical testing fails)
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (prejudice assessment for denial of counsel of choice)
Frady v. United States, 456 U.S. 152 (procedural-default cause-and-prejudice framework)
Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (presumption on merits does not always excuse statutory procedural waiver)
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (prisoner’s limited capacity to comply with state procedural rules; role of counsel)
State v. Henderson, 307 Conn. 533 (statutory framework and duties re: public defender eligibility)
State v. Flemming, 116 Conn. App. 469 (upholding trial court acceptance of public defender determination when supported by facts)
Dennis v. Commissioner of Correction, 134 Conn. App. 520 (Appellate Court precedent on presumption of prejudice for denial-of-counsel claims)
State v. Gamer, 152 Conn. App. 1 (examples of local practices when public defender denies services)