New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 783 F.3d 946

New York sought review of FERC Orders 773 and 773-A defining bulk electric system and local distribution exemptions under the Federal Power Act and Electricity Modernization Act of 2005.
FERC adopted a 100 kV operating threshold plus specific inclusions and exclusions to identify facilities within the bulk electric system, with individualized review available for exemptions or jurisdictional determinations.
FERC structured two pathways: a general threshold with four inclusions/exclusions and a separate process for case-by-case jurisdictional determinations after notice-and-comment and potential NERC exemptions.
New York argued the threshold sweeps in local-distribution facilities and that the procedures improperly burden facilities to prove exemption while jurisdiction is asserted.
FERC maintained the threshold is a preliminary, not determinative, filter subject to adjustment and individualized review, and that the procedures comply with statutory requirements and provide explicit factfinding when determining jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 100 kV threshold is a reasonable jurisdictional proxy.	New York says it unlawfully sweeps in local-distribution facilities.	FERC contends threshold is a provisional filter guiding jurisdictional determinations and is supported by record.	Yes; threshold reasonable as a non-determinative initial boundary.
Whether the procedures for identifying jurisdiction are arbitrary and capricious under APA.	Procedures lack explicit local-distribution findings and improperly shift burden.	Procedures are reasoned, with full factfinding and notice-and-comment for individualized determinations.	No; actions are supported by substantial evidence and reasoned decisionmaking.
Whether the petitioning structure (who may petition, burden, and sequencing) is lawful.	Only facilities can petition for individualized review; burden improperly rests on facilities.	Procedural framework allows broad participation and does not shift evidentiary burden.	No; framework consistent with statutory exhaustion and agency rulemaking.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (Supreme Court 1984) (establishes two-step deferential review of agency statutory interpretation)
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court 1978) (deference to agency procedural rules in technical matters; substantial deference in factfinding)
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (Supreme Court 2013) (jurisdictional challenges and agency procedures receive deference in Chevron context)
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (Supreme Court 2012) (clear congressional intent controls; statutory ambiguity addressed with deference to agency interpretations)
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (Supreme Court 1951) (substantial evidence standard for agency factfinding)
NLRB v. G & T Terminal Packaging Co., 246 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirms deference to agency expertise in evaluating evidence)
Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (deference to agency interpretation of local-distribution exception under FPA)