Nevares v. M.L.S., 2015 Utah LEXIS 80

Background

Bobby Nevares had a brief sexual relationship with M.L.S. in Colorado; she became pregnant and later traveled to Utah, gave birth there, and placed the child for adoption without notifying Nevares.
After learning of the birth in Utah, Nevares filed a paternity petition in Utah; he had earlier completed a Colorado adoption agency "Anticipated Relinquishment Reply Form" indicating intent to contest but did not file a Colorado court action.
Respondents (the mother and the adoption agency) moved for summary judgment arguing (1) Utah Code § 78B-6-111 bars Nevares because the child was conceived by conduct that would be a Utah sexual offense, and (2) Utah Code § 78B-6-122 required Nevares to have affirmatively established parental rights under Colorado law and he failed to do so.
The district court rejected the §111 argument but granted summary judgment based on its reading of §122, holding Nevares had to take affirmative steps under Colorado law to preserve rights.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed: it held §78B-6-122 incorporates the mother’s home-state (Colorado) requirements (which do not bar Nevares here), and interpreted §78B-6-111 not to apply extraterritorially to sexual conduct wholly outside Utah.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Nevares)	Defendant's Argument (Respondents)	Held
1) Meaning of Utah Code §78B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(B) — must father "fully comply" with last-state requirements to preserve notice/parental rights?	§122 should be read to incorporate the requirements of the mother’s last state (Colorado); Nevares complied with Colorado’s requirements because no Colorado termination petition was filed, so he did not forfeit rights.	§122 requires proactive, affirmative steps (e.g., filing paternity in Colorado) to establish parental rights; Nevares failed to do so and thus lacks standing.	The court held §122 incorporates the mother’s home-state legal requirements (Colorado); because Colorado did not require the proactive steps here, §122 does not bar Nevares.
2) Applicability of Utah Code §78B-6-111 — does it bar a father whose conduct "would constitute" a Utah sexual offense when the conduct occurred out-of-state between non‑Utahns?	§111 should be limited: it requires that the conduct could sustain a Utah criminal charge (i.e., satisfy jurisdictional prerequisites); if conduct occurred wholly outside Utah with no Utah nexus, §111 does not apply.	§111 applies if the conduct would meet the actus reus and mens rea of a Utah sexual offense regardless of where it occurred; thus it bars Nevares because his relationship with a 15‑year‑old would violate Utah law.	The court held §111 does not apply to conduct lacking a jurisdictional nexus to Utah and therefore did not bar Nevares.
3) Due process / extraterritoriality concern — may Utah apply §111 to conduct wholly in another state?	Applying §111 extraterritorially raises serious due process problems (notice and fairness); where father reasonably relied on the law of the state where conduct occurred, Utah cannot cut off rights without jurisdictional nexus.	Respondents contend §111’s text and purpose allow application whenever conduct would violate Utah law; due process is not implicated because Utah courts have adoption jurisdiction.	The majority relied on the presumption against extraterritoriality and constitutional avoidance to limit §111 to conduct with a Utah nexus to avoid grave due process doubt.
4) Remedy / choice-of-law on remand — what law governs possible termination if sexual misconduct is alleged?	If misconduct outside Utah is raised, Colorado law (the mother’s home state) governs whether parental rights are barred; Colorado requires a conviction or other specified predicate.	Respondents favored applying §111 to bar Nevares in Utah.	The court remanded; it noted Colorado law provisions (or other statutes/circumstances) may be the proper vehicle to address misconduct claims and that other defenses or grounds for termination remain open.

Key Cases Cited

Bahr v. Imus, 250 P.3d 56 (Utah 2011) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass’n v. Atherton, 267 P.3d 227 (Utah 2011) (due-process principle: notice and opportunity to be heard)
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes)
Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014) (due process requires a defendant’s own contacts with the forum)
World‑Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (limits of personal jurisdiction under due process)
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (minimum contacts test for jurisdiction)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (parental-rights termination demands heightened procedural protections)
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (limits on extraterritorial state power; nexus requirement)
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (distinguishing punitive criminal sanctions from civil regulatory schemes)
Peña v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1996) (criminal conduct may foreclose parental rights in certain contexts)