Neppel v. Development Homes, 953 N.W.2d 642

Z.N., a developmentally disabled resident at Development Homes, Inc. (DHI), was allegedly raped by another resident, S.O., who had documented predatory sexual behavior.
DHI and the North Dakota Dept. of Human Services approved placement and mitigation measures (including one-on-one staffing and a behavioral intervention plan) for S.O.; those measures failed in practice.
Staff did not immediately report the rape, did not separate S.O. and Z.N. that night, and Z.N. did not receive medical attention until days later after his mother insisted.
Pamela Neppel (mother and guardian) sued DHI and others for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); she sought to amend to add claims under the Developmental Disability Act and exemplary damages (motion denied).
A jury awarded $550,000 (including $100,000 for Z.N. negligence and $450,000 for emotional distress to Z.N. and Neppel); the district court later applied a $250,000 charitable-liability cap to amend the judgment.
On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed denial of leave to amend and denial of attorney fees, reversed the denial of DHI’s JML on IIED (holding IIED unsupported as a matter of law), and held the amended-judgment appeal moot; case remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Leave to amend complaint	Neppel sought to add Developmental Disability Act claims and exemplary damages	Motion was untimely under the scheduling order; prejudicial delay	Affirmed denial—district did not abuse discretion (untimely)
Attorney fees under Dev. Disability Act §25-01.2-17	Neppel asserted fees authorized because she "enforced" statutory rights by obtaining redress	Fees unavailable for ordinary tort recovery; statute applies to proceedings enforcing statutory rights	Affirmed denial—statute does not authorize fees for common-law tort claims
Judgment as a matter of law on IIED	Neppel argued DHI’s placement and post-rape conduct was extreme, outrageous, intentional/reckless causing severe distress	DHI argued conduct, at worst negligent or careless, cannot meet the "extreme and outrageous" standard as a matter of law	Reversed denial of JML—IIED not supported; DHI entitled to judgment as a matter of law
Application of charitable-liability cap (amended judgment)	Neppel argued applying charitable immunity was procedurally/substantively improper	DHI argued it qualifies as a charitable organization and cap applies	Issue rendered moot by IIED ruling; appellate court declined to address further

Muchow v. Lindbald, 435 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1989) (recognizing IIED elements and articulating the "extreme and outrageous" standard)
Hougum v. Valley Mem'l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1998) (district court gate-keeper role on whether conduct can be "extreme and outrageous")
G.K.T. v. T.L.T., 798 N.W.2d 872 (N.D. 2011) (if reasonable people could differ, IIED is for the jury)
Hysjulien v. Hill Top Home of Comfort, Inc., 827 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 2013) (reiterating IIED’s "strenuously high" standard)
Ihli v. Lazzaretto, 864 N.W.2d 483 (N.D. 2015) (district court has broad discretion to deny untimely amendment)
Grandbois & Grandbois, Inc. v. City of Watford City, 685 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 2004) (affirming denial of untimely motion to amend)
Gratech Co. v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 729 N.W.2d 326 (N.D. 2007) (successful litigant not entitled to fees absent statute or agreement)
Lynch v. Sweeney, 732 N.W.2d 377 (N.D. 2007) (award of attorney fees is generally within court’s discretion)
Onstad v. Jaeger, 949 N.W.2d 214 (N.D. 2020) (appellate courts generally do not decide moot issues)