486 F.Supp.3d 388
D.D.C.2020Background
- Pro se plaintiff Akube Ndoromo sued DOJ officials after forfeiture of funds and two vehicles tied to his 2007 federal convictions for health-care fraud, false statements, and money laundering; criminal judgment ordered $1,856,812.71 restitution and forfeiture.
- The Government also obtained a civil forfeiture judgment in United States v. $455,273.72 (summary judgment for government in 2011) affirming proceeds nexus to criminal conduct.
- Ndoromo previously sued raising substantially identical claims in Ndoromo v. Sessions (D.D.C. 18-cv-2339); that case was dismissed (July 2, 2019) and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
- This action (filed Nov. 18, 2019 in D.C. Superior and removed) again alleges: wrongful forfeiture, violations of the False Claims Act, and a claim under 12 U.S.C. § 1817; defendants moved to dismiss and plaintiff moved to recuse the judge.
- The court denied recusal (no extrajudicial bias and prior rulings alone insufficient) and granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, relying largely on claim/issue preclusion, the bar against collateral attacks on forfeiture, and the inapplicability/misuse of the cited statutes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recusal of judge | Judge must recuse because she previously dismissed Ndoromo's similar case and "cannot be a judge and a witness" | Prior rulings do not show extrajudicial bias; no factual basis that judge would be a witness | Denied — prior adverse rulings and judicial knowledge from official duties do not require recusal absent extrajudicial bias or deep‑seated antagonism |
| Challenge to forfeiture orders | Forfeitures of bank accounts, businesses, vehicles and funds were wrongful and must be undone | Claims are precluded by prior adjudications and criminal conviction; cannot collaterally attack in a new civil suit | Dismissed — claim and issue preclusion apply; collateral attack on in rem forfeiture barred; criminal conviction estops these arguments |
| False Claims Act claim | Government falsely took plaintiff's funds — FCA permits recovery | FCA prevents fraud on the Government; it does not provide a remedy for persons claiming the government defrauded them | Dismissed — FCA inapplicable and previously rejected in related appeals |
| 12 U.S.C. § 1817 claim | Forfeiture of bank accounts violated §1817 notice/acquisition rules; seeks daily penalties | Claim is another collateral attack tied to forfeiture; no factual pleading showing §1817 elements; sovereign‑immunity/waiver issues | Dismissed — precluded, inadequately pleaded, and statute not shown to apply against the Government in these circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (court need not accept legal conclusions or inferences not supported by alleged facts)
- Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (district court must consider pro se plaintiff’s filings broadly, including responsive filings)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (complaint must plead facts plausibly showing liability)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- S.E.C. v. Loving Spirit Found., Inc., 392 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (recusal standard: objective test whether a reasonable, informed observer would question impartiality)
- United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (recusal jurisprudence and objective standard articulation)
- Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994) (judicial rulings are ordinarily not a valid basis for bias recusal absent deep‑seated antagonism)
- Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951) (prior criminal conviction may collateral‑estop defendant in subsequent civil proceedings)
- United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (civil forfeiture is not punishment for Double Jeopardy purposes)
- Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 432 F.3d 437 (2d Cir. 2005) (knowledge gained by judge in judicial capacity is not a basis for disqualification)
