Ndongo v. Sessions, 689 F. App'x 7

Petitioner Cheikhna Abdoulaye Ndongo, a native of Mauritania, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief based on being born into slavery and fearing persecution by his former master.
An IJ denied relief, stating serious inconsistencies in Ndongo's testimony and applying the REAL ID Act credibility standards; the BIA affirmed.
Key factual inconsistencies included: contradictory statements about his wife’s place of birth and current residence, the wife’s ethnicity being listed as Bidane (a group typically associated with slaveholders), and conflicting accounts of who aided his escape.
Ndongo also provided inconsistent statements about whether slaves were permitted to marry and offered corroborating evidence (a letter from his brother and a psychologist’s report) that the agency gave diminished weight.
The Second Circuit reviewed both the IJ and BIA opinions, found the adverse credibility determination supported by substantial evidence, and denied the petition for review.

Issue	Ndongo's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether there is an explicit adverse credibility finding	IJ merely cited inconsistencies; but decision does not clearly reject credibility	Agency did make an explicit REAL ID Act-based credibility finding	Court: IJ/BIA made a sufficiently explicit adverse credibility determination and it is reviewable
Whether inconsistencies about wife’s birth/location undermine credibility	Ndongo said confusion/explained wife born in Senegal but enslaved in Mauritania	Government: inconsistencies make the slavery claim implausible	Court: Inconsistencies were material and reasonably found implausible; adverse credibility upheld
Whether statement about marriage bans was reconciled	Ndongo: meant slaves could not marry without master’s consent	Government: explanation insufficient to cure inconsistency	Court: Explanation plausible but not compelling; factfinder not required to accept it
Whether corroborating evidence rehabilitated testimony	Ndongo: brother’s letter and psychologist’s report corroborate claim	Government: letters unreliable, psychologist lacked independent knowledge	Court: Agency reasonably gave diminished weight to those documents; corroboration insufficient

Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524 (2d Cir. 2006) (court may review both IJ and BIA decisions for completeness)
Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2008) (defer to IJ credibility determinations unless no reasonable factfinder could make them)
Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005) (petitioner must show a reasonable factfinder would be compelled to credit inconsistent testimony)
Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2000) (IJ must decide explicitly whether testimony is credible)
Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2008) (REAL ID Act credibility analysis guidance)
Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2007) (agency may find testimony implausible)
Chen v. U.S. Attorney General, 454 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2006) (reasonable explanations for inconsistencies may still be rejected)
Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2007) (insufficient corroboration cannot rehabilitate incredible testimony)
Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012) (weight of documents from interested witnesses is for the agency)
Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2013) (expert reports lacking independent knowledge merit less weight)
Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2006) (adverse credibility dispositive when all relief is based on same factual predicate)