Naumovski v. Norris
934 F.3d 200
2d Cir.2019Background
- Elizabeth Naumovski, an assistant women’s basketball coach at Binghamton University, was subject to rumors (beginning 2008–09) that she had an inappropriate relationship with a female student-athlete (J.W.).
- Coaches Nicole Scholl (head coach) and James Norris (athletics official) learned of complaints and imposed restrictions; tensions and complaints about Naumovski’s favoritism and performance continued into 2010.
- Scholl and Norris decided in late February 2010 to terminate Naumovski; she was told March 10, 2010 that she was being fired for "performance reasons" and resigned.
- Naumovski filed charges with state and federal agencies and then sued (2011) alleging sex discrimination, perceived sexual-orientation discrimination, and other claims under Title VII, Title IX, the Fourteenth Amendment (via § 1983), and state law; most claims against institutional defendants were dismissed; two § 1983 claims against Scholl and Norris remained (disparate treatment and hostile work environment).
- The district court denied summary judgment in part as to the § 1983 claims but conflated Title VII and § 1983 standards and did not separately resolve qualified immunity; Scholl and Norris appealed asserting qualified immunity.
- The Second Circuit reversed as to the § 1983 claims, holding that the district court erred by applying Title VII standards (motivating-factor, vicarious liability) to § 1983 claims and concluding defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff could not show but-for causation or direct personal liability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1983 disparate-treatment claim survives summary judgment | Naumovski: termination was motivated at least in part by sex, sex-stereotyping, or perception she was gay | Scholl/Norris: no unconstitutional intent by them; termination based on performance and complaints; qualified immunity | Court: Plaintiff failed to show defendants’ own discriminatory intent was a but-for cause; stray remark and performance evidence insufficient; summary judgment for defendants reversed district court and entered for defendants on § 1983 claim |
| Whether § 1983 liability can be premised on students’ discriminatory intent (cat’s-paw/respondeat superior) | Naumovski: students’ false accusations caused defendants to act; employers can be liable for others’ bias | Defendants: § 1983 does not permit vicarious liability; plaintiff must show defendants’ personal discriminatory action or deliberate facilitation | Held: § 1983 does not allow respondeat superior or Title VII-style imputation; plaintiff did not show defendants personally caused the violation; defendants entitled to immunity |
| Standard of causation for § 1983 employment discrimination | Naumovski: Title VII motivating-factor standard should apply (or district court applied it) | Defendants: § 1983 requires but-for causation like other torts and Title VII is distinct | Held: § 1983 claims require but-for causation; Title VII’s motivating-factor standard does not apply |
| Qualified immunity for public officials sued under § 1983 | Naumovski: constitutional rights violated by defendants’ actions; district court allowed claims to proceed | Defendants: no clearly established constitutional violation; objectively reasonable mistakes; entitled to qualified immunity | Held: Defendants entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff did not show clearly established constitutional violation under the proper § 1983 standards |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (framework for burden-shifting in discrimination cases)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (Title VII retaliation but-for causation principle and distinction from motivating-factor rule)
- Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (but-for causation in § 1983 employment cases)
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (no respondeat superior liability under § 1983)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (qualified immunity standard)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (clearly established law must be particularized)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (clarifies need for particularized precedent in qualified immunity analysis)
- Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97 (2d Cir.) (discussing § 1983 employment discrimination and hostile work environment standards)
- Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.) (distinguishing Title VII and § 1983 and applying McDonnell Douglas in this circuit)
- Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. en banc) (Title VII sexual-orientation analysis relevant to statutory, not constitutional, claims)