Naturaland Trust v. Dakota Finance LLC, 41 F.4th 342

Background

Arabella Farm cleared ~20 acres for a farm/event venue without obtaining NPDES/stormwater permits; DHEC inspected, found erosion and inadequate controls, and issued a Notice of Alleged Violation and an invite to an informal enforcement conference.
Conservation groups (Naturaland Trust and South Carolina Trout Unlimited) sent 60‑day notice letters and, after 60 days, filed a Clean Water Act citizen suit seeking injunctions and civil penalties.
After the citizen suit was filed, DHEC and Arabella Farm entered a consent order imposing a $6,000 penalty and requiring permit, plans, and remediation steps.
The district court dismissed the citizen suit, holding (a) the Clean Water Act’s diligent‑prosecution bar (33 U.S.C. §1319(g)(6)(A)(ii)) precluded the federal claims because the State had “commenced and [was] diligently prosecuting” a comparable action; (b) South Carolina Trout Unlimited failed to adequately identify itself in the 60‑day notice; and (c) declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
The Fourth Circuit majority reversed and remanded: it held the diligent‑prosecution bar does not implicate Article III subject‑matter jurisdiction, a state notice of alleged violation (standing alone) does not necessarily “commence” a §1319(g)‑comparable action, and the notice letter adequately identified South Carolina Trout Unlimited.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the diligent‑prosecution bar in 33 U.S.C. §1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) is jurisdictional	Bar is a statutory precondition but not jurisdictional; it should not be applied as a limit on Article III jurisdiction	District court/State treated the bar as stripping jurisdiction, so suit must be dismissed	Court: The bar is not jurisdictional under Supreme Court standards and does not deprive the court of Article III jurisdiction
Whether DHEC’s notice of alleged violation “commenced” a State action comparable to §1319(g) (thus triggering the diligent‑prosecution bar)	Notice did not commence a formal, public §1319(g)‑type proceeding; citizen suit filed prior to commencement so bar does not apply	Notice was the first formal step in DHEC’s administrative enforcement and thus did commence a State action comparable to §1319(g)	Court: The notice alone did not commence a comparable action; the diligent‑prosecution bar therefore did not preclude the citizen suit
Whether the 60‑day notice to the violator satisfied the CWA/40 C.F.R. identification requirement for South Carolina Trout Unlimited	The notice gave sufficient identifying details (national org with local chapters, context, and counsel contact) to permit identification of the eventual plaintiff	Notice referenced only “Trout Unlimited” (not explicitly “South Carolina Trout Unlimited”), so it was deficient	Court: The notice was adequate; South Carolina Trout Unlimited was properly identified and should be reinstated
Whether §1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) bars injunctive relief in a citizen suit when the State has commenced/diligently prosecuted a comparable action	Plaintiffs: the statutory bar refers to “civil penalty action,” so injunctive claims survive	Defendants/Dissent: allowing injunctions would undermine States’ primary enforcement role and permit duplicitous suits	Court (majority): did not resolve the larger statutory split on injunctions; remanded for further proceedings (dissent would have preserved injunctive issue for merits review)

Key Cases Cited

Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019) (Supreme Court guidance limiting what Congress may label "jurisdictional")
Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011) (tests for when a rule is properly called jurisdictional)
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (statutory rules are nonjurisdictional absent clear congressional intent)
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (jurisdictional distinctions and thresholds)
Reed Elsevier Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (statutory placement and labeling inform jurisdictional analysis)
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (CWA citizen‑suit framework and limits)
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (citizen suits meant to supplement, not supplant, governmental enforcement)
Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. Commissioners of Carroll County, 523 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2008) (prior Fourth Circuit application of judicial‑proceeding bar under §1365(b))
Arkansas Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994) (state enforcement commencement may be evaluated with deference to state procedures)
Friends of Milwaukee's Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 382 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2004) (action ‘commences’ when public‑notice/participation protections become available)
McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (discussing comparability and the 1987 amendments extending bar to administrative penalty actions)
Paper, Allied‑Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers v. Cont'l Carbon Co., 428 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 2005) (rough‑comparability test for penalty, participation, and judicial‑review features)
United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 1999) (comparability analysis under §1319(g))