National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175

The National Rifle Association (NRA) contracted with New York-regulated insurance entities for insurance programs, which became the subject of regulatory investigations led by Maria Vullo, superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS).
Vullo began investigating NRA-affiliated insurance policies, initially after a gun-control advocacy group alerted authorities to alleged legal violations related to insuring intentional criminal acts without proper licensing.
Vullo allegedly communicated to Lloyd’s of London and other insurers that DFS would be more lenient on unrelated infractions if these entities ceased doing business with the NRA and other gun groups.
Vullo issued Guidance Letters and a press release, encouraging DFS-regulated entities to assess reputation risks and to consider cutting ties with the NRA and similar organizations.
Following Vullo’s actions and communications, Lloyd's, Lockton, and Chubb ended their business relationships with the NRA and entered into consent decrees with the DFS, agreeing to monetary penalties and to discontinue NRA-related insurance programs.
The NRA alleged these actions constituted unconstitutional coercion and viewpoint discrimination, violating the First Amendment, while the lower courts had dismissed the claims as permissible government action.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Vullo’s conduct constituted unconstitutional coercion against NRA’s advocacy	Vullo used state power to coerce insurers to sever ties with NRA and suppress gun-rights advocacy	Actions were permissible government speech and law enforcement, not coercion	NRA plausibly alleged First Amendment violation by coercion
Whether encouragement to manage “reputational risks” is coercive	Was a veiled threat backed by regulatory power, not mere advice	Letters and statements were nonthreatening, persuasive government speech	In context, actions could be seen as coercive threats
Whether conceded illegalities in NRA-endorsed insurance excuse Vullo’s conduct	Illegality of policies doesn’t justify singling out NRA to suppress speech	Vullo was enforcing state law, not targeting speech	Enforcement can’t be used to punish disfavored expression
Applicability of qualified immunity at motion-to-dismiss stage	Vullo’s actions violated clearly established First Amendment law	No clear legal standard at time—qualified immunity should apply	Court did not decide; issue remanded

Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (establishes that government “threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion” to suppress disfavored speech violates the First Amendment)
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (distinguishes between government’s own speech and the Free Speech Clause application to private parties)
Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218 (2017) (government is not required to be viewpoint-neutral in its own speech)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (motion to dismiss standard—courts assume truth of well-pleaded factual allegations)