National Auto Service Centers, Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC
192 So. 3d 498
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2016Background
- F/R obtained a $2,100,578.64 judgment (2010) against National Auto Service and then pursued discovery and proceedings supplementary to reach assets allegedly transferred to National Auto Properties (parent company) and Levin-related parties.
- In Nov. 2007 National Auto Service assigned three promissory notes to National Auto Properties; F/R learned of the assignments during Leonard Levin’s Jan. 30, 2012 deposition and received related accounting records on Jan. 8, 2013.
- F/R sued in supplemental proceedings under FUFTA alleging the assignments were made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors and sought to void the transfers and obtain monetary relief under section 726.108.
- The trial court found the assignments actually fraudulent and voided them, reasoning FUFTA’s one-year savings clause runs from discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer (not mere discovery of the transfer).
- Levin Parties moved to dismiss as time-barred under § 726.110(1); they argued the assignments (Nov. 14, 2007) were discovered Jan. 30, 2012 (over one year before F/R initiated FUFTA proceedings), and thus the claim was untimely.
- The district court reversed, holding (1) the one-year savings period begins when the transfer itself is discovered, not when its fraudulent nature is discovered, and (2) § 726.110(1) is a statute of repose not subject to equitable estoppel; judgment for Levin Parties and remand for entry of judgment in their favor.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (F/R) | Defendant's Argument (Levin Parties) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trigger for FUFTA §726.110(1) one‑year savings clause: discovery of transfer vs. discovery of fraudulent nature | One-year period should start when claimant discovers (or should have discovered) facts showing the transfer was fraudulent (i.e., discovery of fraud) | One-year period starts when claimant discovers (or reasonably could have discovered) the transfer itself | Court held the one-year period begins on discovery of the transfer (not discovery of the fraudulent nature) |
| Whether §726.110(1) is subject to equitable estoppel (i.e., statute of limitations vs. statute of repose) | Levin’s alleged concealment and false testimony equitably estop them from invoking §726.110(1) | §726.110(1) is a statute of repose that extinguishes the cause of action and cannot be avoided by equitable estoppel | Court held §726.110(1) is a statute of repose and not subject to equitable estoppel |
Key Cases Cited
- Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So.3d 362 (Fla. 2013) (plain‑meaning statutory construction principles)
- Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So.2d 1086 (Fla. 2006) (do not rewrite unambiguous statutes)
- Freitag v. McGhie, 947 P.2d 1186 (Wash. 1997) (interpreting identical Uniform Act language to trigger one‑year on discovery of fraudulent nature)
- Schmidt v. HSC, Inc., 319 P.3d 416 (Haw. 2014) (same interpretation as Freitag; relied on remedial purpose)
- Nehme v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 863 So.2d 201 (Fla. 2003) (distinguishing statutes of repose from limitations)
- Knowles v. Beverly Enters.-Fla., Inc., 898 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2005) (remedial statutes are construed liberally but courts may not rewrite clear statutory text)