Opinion of the Court by
Wе hold that, in accordance with the text of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 651C-9(1) (1993) 1 pertaining to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA 2 ), that the one year limitations period that begins on the date a transfer “was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant” commences when a plaintiff discovers or could reasonably have discovered a transfer’s fraudulent nature. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), however, held that the limitations period begins when the transfer, rather than its fraudulent nature, is discovered, and resultingly affirmed the October 7, 2008 judgment of the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit (the court) 3 that dismissed the action brought by Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellants Thomas Frank Schmidt and Lorinna Jhineil Schmidt (collectively, Petitioners) on the ground that the statute of limitations *499 period had run on Petitioners’ action. 4 Based on this ruling, the ICA did not reach Petitioners’ points of error on the merits of the case raised in Petitioners’ October 29, 2008 appeal from the court’s October 7, 2008 final judgment in favor of Respondents/ Defendants-Appellees, HSC, Inc. (HSC), Richard Henderson Sr. (Richard), and Eleanor Henderson (Eleanor), (collectively, Respondents). Because the ICA erred in its ruling on the statute of limitations issue and should have decided the merits of the claim raised in Petitioners’ appeal, we vacate the October 9, 2013 judgment of the ICA filed pursuant to its August 30, 2013 Memorandum Opinion and remand the ease to the ICA for disposition consistent with this opinion.
I.
A.
This case can be traced back to a complaint for foreclosure filed in the court 5 on March 27, 1997, by RFI against Petitioners, as well as Amerasian Land Co. (Amerasian) 6 and Turlington Corporation, filed in Civ. No. 97-1235-03. 7
On June 10,1991, Petitioners executed and delivered a promissory note secured by a mortgage to Investors Finance, Inc. (Investors) in the amount of $228,853.72.
Realty II,
On February 24, 1998, the court granted a motion for summary judgment and an interlocutory decree of foreclosure for RFI, and determined the principal and interest amounts owed by Petitioners to RFI. Id. at *2. In the aftermath of the court’s February 24, 1998 judgment, RFI sold Petitioners’ notes and mortgages to another investor, Waikiki Investments 418, Inc. (Waikiki Investments), and allowed Waikiki Investments to collect the monies owed on the notes and mortgages in order to discharge the mortgages burdening the mortgaged properties. Id. at *3. Waikiki Investments collected a total of $534,000 from Amerasian and Lulani Properties, LLC (Lulani) before eventually defaulting on its agreement with RFI. Id. at *4.
RFI then filed notice reasserting its status as real-party-in-interest and resumed foreclosure proceedings against Petitioners.
Id.
After re-entering the case, RFI filed a motion for an order approving confirmation of the private sale of the subject properties on October 25, 1999.
Realty I,
Without informing Petitioners, in February 2000 RFI transferred the proceeds of the foreclosure sale to four creditors of RFI’s parent company, HSC.
Schmidt v. HSC, Inc.,
*500
No. 29454,
However, after RFI transferred the proceeds of the foreclosure sale to the creditors of HSC, this court in
Realty II
agreed that RFI should have credited Petitioners for the payments made to Waikiki Investments.
Realty II,
B.
On remand, the court 8 issued a December 21, 2004 final judgment with regard to the surplus sale proceeds, requiring RFI to repay approximately $537,000 to Petitioners. At this point, Petitioners were still unaware that the proceeds of the foreclosure sale had been transferred.
On March 18, 2005, the parties’ counsel met to discuss RFI’s payment of the December 21, 2004 final judgment. At the meeting, Petitioners’ counsel received RFI’s monthly bank statement for February, 2000. The monthly bank statement revealed that following the payment from the foreclosure commissioner, RFI wrote four cheeks, one for $54,399.55, one for $78,000.00, one for $119,393.42, and one for $165,058.42. The monthly bank statement also indicated that the ending balance in RFI’s bank account was $71,857.79. However, there was apparently no indication of who received the checks.
On April 20, 2005, counsel for both parties attended a “meet and confer” regarding the four checks listed in the monthly bank statement. The results of the “meet and confer” are not a part of the record. However, it is undisputed that at the meeting, counsel for Petitioners received copies of the four checks and discovered that the checks were made “to insiders.”
On July 26, 2005, counsel for Petitioners deposed Michael Chagami (Chagami), the treasurer of HSC, Inc. Chagami explained that RFI transferred the proceeds of the foreclosure sale to HSC to “satisfy certain obligations of HSC.” Chagami further stated that as of December of 2004, RFI was “insolvent.”
Subsequently, on September 1, 2005, Petitioners filed an ex parte motion for issuance of execution and garnishment of the December 21, 2004 judgment against the assets of both RFI and HSC. In their memorandum in support of the motion, Petitioners asserted that the transfers were fraudulent under HRS §§ 651C-4(a)(l) (1993), 651C-4(a)(2) (1993), and HRS § 651C-5 (1993). 9 Accordingly, Petitioners asserted that they were entitled to execution and garnishment against the assets transferred under HRS § 651C-7(b) (1993). The court denied Petitioners’ motion “without prejudice to filing a separate actiоn against the proper parties.”
C.
On April 7, 2006, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the court against Respondents in Civ. No. 06-1-0611-04 that is the subject of the instant appeal. The Complaint alleged, inter alia, that the transfers were fraudulent and Petitioners were entitled to remedies under HRS § 651C-7.
The case proceeded to a bench trial on July 1 and 2, 2008. The parties submitted written closing arguments on July 31, 2008. In their closing argument, Petitioners asserted that the transfers violated HRS § 651C-4(a)(1)
10
because they were made with “[a]c-
*501
tual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Petitioners.” Additionally, Petitioners asserted that their claims fell within the statute of limitations established by HRS § 651C-9(l).
11
In opposition, Respondents asserted that Petitioners “failed to prove actual intent clearly and convincingly,”
see Kekona v. Abastillas,
On October 7, 2008, the court entered the following relevant findings of fact (findings), conclusions of law (conclusions), and Order:
Findings of Fact
[[Image here]]
5.This action relates to four allegedly fraudulent transfers by RFI: (a) a check payable to Defendant [Eleanor] dated February 11, 2000 in the amount of $78,000; (b) a check payable to [Goodsill] dated February 15, 2000 in the amount of $119,393.42; © a check payable to Defendant [Richard] dated February 11, 2000 in the amount of $54,399.55; and (d) a check payable to [Kamehameha Schools] in the amount of $165,058.42 from February 2000....
6. The Transfers were made from the proceeds of a mortgage foreclosure sale which involved a transaction in which [Petitioners] were the mortgagors, and RFI, a subsidiary of HSC, was the mortgagee.
7. The foreclosure sale proceeds received by RFI were used for the Transfers. The Transfers were payable to creditors of HSC.
8. There were some suspicious circumstances regarding the Transfers:
a. HSC was the parent company of RFI The Transfers were made to creditors of HSC in order to pay RFI’s obligations to HSC;
b. they were made through a separate account apparently created to effectuate them;
c. they were made immediately after receipt of the procеeds of the foreclosure sale; and
d. [Petitioners] appealed the trial court’s .judgment, so, at the time of the Transfers, it was questionable whether RFI would prevail on appeal. In order for RFI to prevail on appeal, the appellate court *502 would have to determine that it was appropriate to require [Petitioners] to, in effect, pay twice in order to obtain a release from the judgment received by RFI in the foreclosure action: once to the assignee of the judgment, and once to RFI itself.
9. These circumstances did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of any actual intent on the part of [Respondents] to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditors of RFI:
a. When the Transfers were made, there was no actual debt owed to the Plaintiffs by RFI.
b. There was no expert testimony demonstrating that the Transfers were in violation of generally accepted accounting practices.
c. At the time of the Transfers, there was no business need to retain сash for the benefit of [Petitioners] should [Petitioners] prevail upon appeal. The onus was on [Petitioners] to obtain a stay in order to maintain the status quo pending the appeal. This would have enabled them to have a fund available to recover from if they prevailed on appeal. [Petitioners] did not obtain such a stay.
d. At the time of the Transfers, RFI had bona fide debts owed to HSC and there was a legitimate business purpose in transferring RFI’s assets to reduce those debts.
[[Image here]]
f. RFI did not conceal the Transfers by, for example, not recording the Transfers in its accounting records or by entering into agreements with the transferees not to disclose the existence of the Transfers.
g. The Transfers did not render RFI insolvent at the time they were made.
h. RFI did not terminate its existence after the Transfers.
Conclusions of Law
[[Image here]]
5. Despite the facts reflecting in [findings] 8(a)-8(d), [Petitioners] did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that RFI actually intended to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditors of RFI, as required by HRS § 651C-4(a)(l).
Order of Dismissal
Based on the foregoing [findings and conclusions] ... this action is to be dismissed and judgment is to be entered in favor of [Respondents] and against [Petitioners].
(Emphases added.) The court did not discuss Respondents’ argument that Petitioners’ claim was untimely under HRS § 651C-9(1).
Following the court’s ruling in favor of Respondents, Respondents filed a Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs on October 10, 2008. Petitioners filed an opposition memorandum. After Petitioners appealed to the ICA, on January 9, 2009, the court issued an “Order on [Respondents’] Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs Filed on October 10, 2008, requesting that the matter be remanded to the court for ... an order [ ] setting forth the ... award of attorney’s fees and costs.” 12
II.
A.
Petitioners appealed to the ICA on November 5, 2008. In their Opening Brief filed on March 19,2009, Petitioners challenged the court’s conclusion that Respondents did not intend to hinder, defraud, or delay Petitioners by transferring funds from RFI to HSC, and sevei’al findings supporting that conclusion. Respondents filed a cross-appeal on January 9, 2009. In their Opening Brief on cross-appeal, Respondents asserted that Petitioners’ UFTA claim under HRS § 651C-4(a)(1) was time-barred. Rеspondents also argued in their cross-appeal that the court erroneously denied their request for attorneys’ fees. The ICA did not discuss Petitioners’ arguments that the court’s findings and conclusions were erroneous. See discussion infra. Rather, the ICA ruled on the statute of limitations issue raised in the cross-appeal instead, holding that Petitioners’ UFTA *503 claim should have been dismissed as untimely-
B.
In their cross-appeal, Respondents maintained that pursuant to HRS § 651C—9(1), “claims based upon [HRS § 651C-4(a)(l) must] be filed ‘within four years after the transfer was made [in this case, in February, 2000] ... or, if later, within one year after the transfer ... was or could have been discovered by the claimant)[ 13 ]’” (Quoting HRS § 651C-9(1).) Here, Petitioners’ claim was brought more than four years after the transfers were made in February, 2000. Therefore, according to Respondents, “[Petitioners’] claim was timely ... only if [ ] they had no knowledge of the disputed transfers prior to April 8, 2005 [one year before Petitioners filed their Complaint] and [] they could not have discovered them before that date with reasonable diligence.”
As to Petitioners’ discovery of the disputеd transfers, Respondents contended that under the discovery rule, “the only discovery necessary to trigger the running of the one-year discovery extension is the discovery of the transfers themselves.” (Emphasis in original.) According to Respondents, Petitioners “became aware of the existence of the transfers ... on March 18, 2005.” (Emphasis in original.) Therefore, Respondents maintain, “[Petitioners’] claim expired on March 18, 2006,” prior to the filing of Petitioners’ Complaint on April 7, 2006.
Additionally, Respondents argued that Petitioners should have discovered evidence of the transfers “long before April 8, 2005,” one year before Petitioners’ Complaint was filed. According to Respondents, “after [this court] ruled in [Petitioners’] favor on March 18, 2004 ... [Petitioners] had tools they could, and should have used to discover the disputed transfers[.]” However, Respondents maintain that Petitioners “delayed meaningfully seeking discovery into [Respondents] assets until March 2005[.]” Therefore Petitioners “have no one to blame but themselves for the extended delay in disсovering their [ ] claim[.]”
C.
In their Answering Brief on cross-appeal, Petitioners argued that the one year period in the discovery rule does not begin until the plaintiffs discover the “fraudulent nature” of the transfer. (Citing
Freitag v. McGhie,
They also contended that they did not initiate discovery earlier because “there was no judgment filed in the foreclosure actions regarding the surplus of the sale proceeds until December 21, 2004.” Petitioners declared that following remand by this court, there was “extensive pleading” because Respondents “opposed the accounting action and forced [Petitioners] to make numerous pleadings to finally result in judgment in their favor.” Petitioners explained that “at no time did RFI’s counsel tell [Petitioners] that RFI was unable to pay any monetary judgment ... over $1,500.”
Also, Petitioners advanced several alternative theories as to why their claim was timely. They contended (1) that the ex parte motion filed for execution/and or garnishment filed on September 1, 2005, “could [also] be construed [ ] as a commencement of an action under HRS § 651C-9(1),” (2) that their claim was timely under HRS § 657-20 (1993),
14
which “extends the statute of limitations by fraudulent concealment,” and (3) that “the statute of limitations of a UFTA claim starts when the creditor has a final judgment against the debtor, not on the date when the transfer was made[.]” (Citing
Cor
*504
tez v. Vogt,
In their Reply Brief, Respondents again argued that Petitioners’ UFTA claim was untimely under the one year period set forth in HRS § 651C—9(1). Respondents asserted that they “did not fraudulently conceal the transfers,” and that the holding in Cortez that the statute of limitations starts when a final judgment is entered “has now been rejected by virtually all jurisdictions.”
III.
The ICA agreed with Respondents’ position that the one year period in HRS § 651C-9(1) begins on the date that the transfer was discovered, rather than on the date the plaintiff discovers “the fraudulent nature of the transfer.”
Schmidt,
“The term ‘transfer’ is specifically defined in HRS § 651C-9(1) to mean ‘every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes a payment of money, a release, a lease, and the creation of a lien or encumbrance.’ ” Id. The ICA noted that if “the Hawai'i Legislature intended to require knowledge of the ‘fraudulent nature’ [of the transfer] to trigger the UFTA statute of limitations, it could have included such language in its statute, as Arizona’s legislature has done, but it did not.” Id. Therefore, the ICA reasoned that the “plain meaning” of HRS § 651C—9(1) required the one year period to begin on March 18, 2005, the date Petitioners disсovered the existence of the transfers. Id. at *5.
Further, the ICA explained that “[i]t is uncontroverted that, on March 18, 2005, [Petitioners] received a Realty Finance bank account statement showing that the four checks ... were disbursed by Realty Finance[.]” Id. at *4. “Thus, on March 18, 2005, [Petitioners] discovered that the transfers occurred.” Id. Consequently, the ICA concluded that “[Petitioners’] UFTA claim was extinguished no later than one year after their discovery of the transfers on March 18, 2005, and their April 7, 2006 complaint was untimely.” Id. at *5.
As a result, the ICA did not discuss several arguments raised by the parties. First, the ICA held that because Petitioner’s UFTA claim was extinguished by HRS § 651C-9(1), it “need not reach the merits of [Petitioners’] points of error contending that the [court] erred in [ ] rejecting their claims.” Id. at *5. Second, the ICA held that it was “unnecessary to address [the] contention” that “the transfers could have been discovered” at an earlier date. Id. at *4 n. 7. Finally, the ICA did not discuss any of the alternative theories that Petitioners raised in support of their position that their claim was timely.
As to Respondеnts’ argument that the court erred in denying their request for attorneys’ fees, the ICA related that “Respondents’ subsequent motions to [the ICA] for temporary remand to allow the [court] to rule on [Respondents’] Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 motion were denied without prejudice on February 10, 2009 and April 23, 2009.”
Id.
at *5. Thus, “the [court] never entered an order determining the amount of attorneys fees and/or costs or the basis for such an award.”
Id.
The ICA “conelude[d] that th[e] case should be remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the [court] to enter a ruling on the substance of [Respondents’] request for attorneys’ fees and costs.”
Id.
(citing
Life of the Land v. Ariyoshi,
IV.
In them Application, Petitioners ask: (1) “Whether the ICA ... [erred in] deciding *505 that Petitioners UFTA claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations and [in] failing to decide that [the court's] decision erroneously decided that Petitioners’ UFTA claim was not рroven, and therefore, ... [denied] Petitioner’s recovery[,]” and (2) “Whether the ICA ... [erred in] remanding the case for a decision on Respondents’ request for attorneys’ fees under HRS § 607-14 and recovery of costs, without deciding the merits of their attorney fee request.” A Response was filed on October 31, 2013. A Reply was filed on November 7, 2013.
V.
As to the initial part of the first question presented in their Application, Petitioners again argue that their UFTA claim was timely under four alternative theories. First, Petitioners maintain that the one year statute of limitations set forth in HRS § 651C-9(1) begins on the date the fraudulent nature of the transfer is discovered, rather than on the date the transfer itself is discovered. Second, Petitioners contend that “the ex parte motion ... for execution and/or garnishment ... could be construed as a commencement of an action under HRS § 651C-9.” Third, Petitioners argue that under HRS § 657-20,
15
the statute of limitations is extended by six years due to fraudulent concealment. Fourth, Petitioners assert that limitations period set forth in HRS § 651C-9(1), which allows the defendаnts to file an HRS § 651C-4(a)(l) action “within four years after the transfer was made” actually begins “when the judgment was final in the underlying action.” (Citing
Cortez,
VI.
A
Petitioners’ first theory as to why their claim was timely is that the “discovery rule” does not begin until a plaintiff discovers the “fraudulent nature” of the transfer. To reiterate, under HRS § 651C-9(1), “a cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer [ 16 ] ... is extinguished unless action is brought,” inter alia, “within one year after the transfer ... was discovered ... or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.” (Emphasis added.)
Petitioners argue that “the effect of HRS § 651C-9 is to extinguish a cause of action for a fraudulent transfer, not just any transfer.” (Emphasis in original.) According to Petitioners, the ICA’s plain language analysis “reads the word fraudulent out of the first sentence of HRS § 651C-9.” (Emphasis in original.) Petitioners also point out that several eases, including
United States v. Green,
Petitioners maintain that their UFTA claim, filed on April 7, 2006, was timely because they “were not aware of the fraudulent *506 transfers until as early as April 20, 2005,” when they rеceived copies of the checks used in the transfers and discovered that the transfers were not made “to proper creditors of RFI.” According to Petitioners, they did not discover “the damage [they suffered] ... until the Chagami deposition on July 26, 2005,” when “for the first time they were informed that RFI was unable to pay the judgment.”
B.
On the other hand, in their Response, Respondents argue that “the ICA’s reading of HRS § 651C-9(1) was correct” because “the plain language [of HRS § 651C-9] directs” that claims are extinguished “one year after a creditor discovers the disputed transfers.” Further, Respondents contend that the Hawaii legislature has not “chosen to modify [HRS § 651C-9(1) ]” with “language that says the repose period starts after the fraudulent character of a transfer is first revealed[.]” Hence, Respondents declare that this court should not add to HRS § 651C-9(1) “unwritten requirements that the Hawaii legislature omitted.”
Additionally, Respondents relate that under HRS § 1-24, “Hawaii courts [must] promote uniformity in the interpretation of uniform laws.” According to Respondents, “most jurisdictions that hаve adopted Hawaii’s version of the [UFTA]” have held that the one year period in HRS § 651C-9(1) begins on the date that plaintiffs discovered the transfer, and not its fraudulent nature. Respondents attached, as an appendix to their Response, a table of other states that adopted the same statute of limitations under the UFTA. In the appendix, Respondents relate that twenty-eight other states have concluded that the one year discovery period begins when the transfer itself is discovered. Respondents assert that, contrastingly, only two jurisdictions have held that the one year period begins when the plaintiff discovers the fraudulent nature of the transfer.
Finally, Respondents argue that even if this court interprets the one year period as beginning when Petitioners’ knew or should have known of the fraudulent nature of the transfers, Petitioners’ claim is still time-barred because Petitioners were “dilatory in efforts to discover[] both the transfer and the alleged evidence of [Respondents’] actual intent.” According to Rеspondents, therefore, Petitioners should have known of the fraudulent nature of the transfers more than a year before their Complaint was filed on April 8, 2006.
In their Reply, Petitioners counter that the cases cited in the appendix are not persuasive, because many of the cases are either federal or state trial court decisions, and not state appellate court decisions. Petitioners also relate that many of the cases cited by Respondents actually do not support the position that the one year period begins to run when the transfers themselves are discovered.
VII.
Initially, it must be observed that the court did not discuss the statute of limitations in its findings and conclusions and therefore did not issue any findings or conclusions regarding when Petitioners discovered the “fraudulent nature” of the transfers. Similarly, the ICA did not discuss the date Petitioners’ discovered the “fraudulent nature” of the transfers.
A.
As explained by the Hawaii federal bankruptcy court, “[s]ome courts read the [HRS § 651C—9(1) ] statute literally and hold that the period begins to run as soon as a creditor discovered or reasonably could have discovered the transfer, even if no one knew the transfer was fraudulent.”
In re Maui Indus. Loan & Fin. Co.,
*507 B.
Both the language of HRS § 651C-9(1) and the underlying purpose of the UFTA suggest that the one year period begins when a plaintiff discovers the fraudulent nature of a potential transfer. Those courts holding that the one year period begins once the plaintiff discovers the transfer itself claim to generally rely on “the actual language used in the statute.”
In re Hill,
On the other hand, it has been asserted that “[e]ommon sense and the statutory purpose of the UFTA necessitate a finding that the statute begins to run with the discovery of the fraudulent nature of the conveyance.”
Freitag,
Moreover, “[i]f the statute were to begin to run when the transfer was made, without regard as to whether the claimant discovered or could have discovered the fraudulent nature of the transfer, those successful at concealing a fraudulent transfer would be rewarded.” Id. “The statute should not reward a person for successful concealment of fraud.” Id. Hence, the Washington Supreme Court held that the UFTA limitation statute “provides a one-year period from the date of discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer within which to initiate a claim[.]” Id.
The interpretation of the UFTA limitations provision advanced in
Freitag
is consistent with our statute. First, HRS § 651C-9 begins by stating “[a] cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer or obligation is extinguished unless action is brought [within the relevant period].” (Emphasis added.) Next, HRS § 651C-9(1) provides that, for actions brought under HRS § 651C-4(a)(l), such as the action in this ease, the limitations period extends until “one year after the transfer ... was or could reasonably have been discovered[.]” The term “transfer” in HRS § 651C-9(1) clearly refers to the “fraudulent transfer” identified in the preceding sentence. “Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.”
State v. Kamana‘o,
118 Hawai‘i 210, 218,
Additionally, it has been explained that in interpreting statutes, this court “must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.”
Blaisdell v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
Finally, “[t]he legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality.”
Kim v. Contractors License Bd., 88
Hawai'i 264, 270,
In sum, interpreting the discovery rule as allowing plaintiffs to file an action within one year of the discovery of the “fraudulent nature” of a transfer, rather than of the transfer itself, is consistent with the statutory language referring to the transfer as a “fraudulent transfer.” Additionally, this interpretation is consonant with the statutory purpose of preventing fraud. Finally, such an interpretation promotes the specific purpose of the discovery rule within the statutory context, i.e., allowing plaintiffs to pursue otherwise untimely claims after discovering their existence. Hence, under HRS § 651C-9(1), Petitioners could bring their HRS § 651C-4(a)(l) claim within a year after discovering the “fraudulent nature” of the transfer from RFI to MSC.
C.
Respondents’ contention that this court must interpret the one year period in HRS § 651C-9(1) as beginning from the date the plaintiffs discover the transfer itself to promote uniformity with other jurisdictions interpretations of the UFTA is incorrect. Respondents’ appendix purportedly demonstrating that twenty-eight other jurisdictions have held that the one year period begins when the transfer was discovered is inaccurate.
First, the cases from many of the jurisdictions cited in the appendix do not discuss the one year “discovery rule” at all. Many of the cases cited in Respondents’ appendix discuss the four year period, not the one year “discovery rule.” 18 Additionally, some of the eases cited in Respondents’ appendix do not concern the UFTA extinguishment provision requiring that the fraudulent transfer action must be brought either within four years of the date the transfer was made or within one year of the date the transfer was discovered, whichever was later. 19 Thus, none of these *509 cases examine the issue of when a transfer was “discovered” under the UFTA limitations statute. These cases are thus irrelevant to the question of when a transfer is “discovered” under HRS § 651C—9(1).
In several of the eases cited by Respondents, the court did hold that the one year period began when the plaintiffs discovered the transfer itself. However, in those cases, the plaintiffs did not raise the argument that the one year period did not begin until they discovered the “fraudulent nature” of the transfer. 20 Hence, none of those courts analyzed the issue of when the one year period begins.
Finally, some of the eases cited by Respondents actually appear to interpret the one year discovery period as beginning on the date the “fraudulent nature” of the transfer was discovered. For example, in
Norwood Grp., Inc. v. Phillips,
In total, the eases cited in Respondents’ appendix do not support Respondents’ contention that “most jurisdictions” have adopted the ICA’s interpretation of HRS § 651C-9(1). Instead based on the foregoing, it is evident that as the ICA concluded, “there is no uniformity in the interpretation of the ‘extinguishment’ provision.”
Schmidt,
In
Cnty. of Hawai'i v. UniDev, LLC,
VIII.
Based on the foregoing, the one year statute of limitations period begins on the date the fraudulent nature of the transfer “was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.” HRS § 651C-9(1). The ICA incorrectly held that the statute of limitations runs from the date of the transfer, rather than the date that Petitioners discovered the fraudulent nature of the trаnsfer. Hence, the ICA’s October 9, 2013 judgment must be vacated.
IX.
As to Petitioners’ second alternative theory, Petitioners contend that the ex parte motion for execution and/or garnishment filed on September 1, 2005 could be construed as the “commencement of an action under HRS § 651C-9.” However, Petitioners cite to no legal authority in support of this conclusory statement. No argument is presented as to why filing the ex parte motion in a different proceeding could be construed as a commencement of the present action. Hence, it is not necessary to discuss this argument further.
See Norton v. Admin. Dir. of the Court,
X.
As to Petitioners’ third alternative theory, Petitioners maintain that “under HRS § 651C-10, the law of fraud discovery applies.” HRS § 651C-10
22
states that “unless displaced by the prоvisions of [the UFTA], the principles of law ... relating to ... fraud ... supplement its provisions.” Petitioners apparently characterize HRS § 657-20, which extends the statute of limitations by six years if a potential defendant fraudulently conceals the existence of a cause of action, as a principle of law “relating to fraud” and therefore contend that “HRS § 657-20 applies to the UFTA claim per HRS § 651C-10.” Petitioners rely on two federal district court cases,
Rundgren v. Bank of New York Mellon,
*511 XI.
Fourth, Petitioners assert that under Cortez, “the [four year] statute of limitations on an UFTA claim starts when the creditor has a final judgment against the debtor, not on the date the transfer was made.” To reiterate, HRS § 651C-9(1) sets forth two alternate limitations periods for actions brought under HRS § 651C-9(1), either “within four years after the transfer was made,” or “if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could have reasonably been discovered by the claimant.” As explained supra, the second limitations period allows plaintiffs to file suit even if they could not have discovered the existence of their cause of action within the four year period.
Petitioners’ first theory was that their UFTA claim was timely under the second prong of the statute, i.e., the one year “discovery rule.” Under their alternate theory, Petitioners take the position that their claim was also timely under the first prong of HRS § 651C-9(1) because, as in Cortez, their claim was brought within four years of the final judgment in the underlying action between Petitioners and RFI.
In
Cortez,
the Californiа Court of Appeals observed that the UFTA statute of limitations section stated that it began at “the time the transfer was made.”
Numerous courts have explained that the decision in
Cortez
is contrary to the plain language of the UFTA limitations provision stating that the four year statute of limitations begins “within four years after the transfer was made[.]” (Emphasis added.) That language “clearly indicates that an action ... must be brought within four years of the date the transfer was made.”
Levy v. Markal Sales Corp.,
Cortez
explainеd that if a creditor asserts that a transfer was fraudulently made by a debtor to escape potential liability in another suit, the creditor may be required to file a second action based on the fraudulent transfer before the initial suit is concluded in order to meet the four year deadline.
Cortez,
However, Petitioners point to nothing indicating our legislature intended to deviate from the plain language of the statute providing that the limitations period begins on the
*512
date of the transfer, rather than the underlying judgment, based on such concerns.
25
See Levy,
XII.
Based on the foregoing, the ICA incorrectly held that the statute of limitations runs from the date of the transfer, rather than from the date that Petitioners’ discovered the fraudulent nature of the transfer. The ICA also did not decide the merits of the ease, as requested by Petitioners in their Opening Brief on appeal.
In the second part of the first question in their Application, Petitioners state that “the ICA’s authorities do not support ... the refusal to decide [Petitioners’] appeal issues[.]” In their Response, Respondents asserted that “[t]he Petition for Certiorari should be rejected” but did not discuss the proper disposition of the ease should this court overrule the ICA on the statute of limitations issue. Finally, in their Reply, Petitioners again maintained that they “ha[d] shown conclusively that the trial court committed sevеral significant reversible errors,” but that “[t]he ICA did not even address Petitioners’ points of error and arguments[.]”
Here, the ICA’s decision on the statute of limitations provision in HRS § 651C—9(1) was wrong as a matter of law. We therefore vacate its ruling on that issue and remand that issue to the ICA. Additionally, we remand the case to the ICA for a ruling on the merits of the ease, as raised in Petitioners’ appeal herein from the October 7, 2008 judgment, irrespective of its decision on the statute of limitations issue on remand.
See Hamilton ex rel. Lethem v. Lethem,
Finally, as to the second question presented in their Application, the ICA’s judgment remanded the ease to the court for a determination of whether Respondents were entitled to attorneys’ fees. A determination of whether Respondents are entitled to attorneys’ fees cannot be made in light of our disposition on the first question inasmuch as the prevailing party must be determined on remand. Consequently, the ICA’s judgment as to this issue is also vacated and remanded.
XIII.
Based on the foregoing, the October 9, 2013 judgment of the ICA is vacated and the case remanded to the ICA for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. HRS § 651C-9 is set forth infra.
. HRS Chapter 651C represents Hawaii’s adoption of the UFTA. The UFTA is a uniform act that has been adopted by 45 jurisdictions. See 7A Uniform Laws Annotated, Part II at 2-3 (2006).
. This case involves proceedings before three different judges. As explained in greater detail
infra,
Realty Finance Inc. (RFI) initially filed a foreclosure action in the First Circuit Court under case number CIV. 97-1235-03. The Honorable Kevin S. Chang presided over the initial proceedings.
Realty Finance, Inc. v. Schmidt (Realty II),
No. 23441,
Following the entry of final judgment in Civ. No. 97-1235-03, Petitioners filed the action that is the subject of the instant appeal, Civ. No. 06-1-228 in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit. The Honorable Greg K. Nakamura presided. In this opinion, the reference to “the court" is used to describe the presiding court in each of the three trial proceedings. However, the judge presiding over specific proceedings is noted.
. The opinion was filed by the Honorable Alexa D.M. Fujise, the Honorable Katherine G. Leonard, and the Honorable Lisa M. Ginoza.
. The Honorable Kevin S. Chang, in the First Circuit Court, presided.
. Neither RFI, Amerasian, nor Turlington Corporation are parties to this present action.
. As explained in greater detail
infra,
the proceedings that are the issue of this appeal are distinct from, but related to the proceedings in the First Circuit Court under case Civ. No. 97-1235-03 described
supra.
Hence, the facts of that case are not a part of the record on appeal. For the purposes of background, the facts of that case are taken from the ICA opinion in
Realty Finance, Inc. v. Schmidt, (Realty I),
No. 23441,
. The Honorable Karen N. Blondín, in the First Circuit Court, presided over the proceedings on remand.
. HRS § 651C-5 establishes the circumstances under which a transfer by a debtor is fraudulent as to a present creditor. Petitioners did not file a cause of action under HRS § 651C-5 in their Complaint.
.HRS § 651C-4 provides in relevant part as follows:
*501 § 651C-4 Transfers fraudulent as to present and future creditors.
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred. if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(1) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or
(2) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:
(A) Was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor werе unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(B) Intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor’s ability to pay as they became due.
(b) In determining actual intent under subsection (a)(1), consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether: (1) The transfer or obligation was to an insider;
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(3) The transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(4) Before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor was sued or threatened with suit;
(5) The transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets;
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(9) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
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(Emphases added.)
. HRS § 651C-9 provides in relevant part as follows:
§ 651C-9 Extinguishment of cause of action. A cause of action with respect to a fraudulent transfer or obligation under this chapter is extinguished unless action is brought:
(1) Under section 651C-4(a)(l), within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant;
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(Emphases added.)
. Subsequently, Respondents filed two motions to temporarily remand the case to the court to allow the court to rule on the attorney’s fees issue. The ICA denied both motions without prejudice,
. The section of HRS § 651C—9(1) allowing a plaintiff to bring an action under HRS § 651C-4(a)(1) within one year after the transfer could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant is referred to herein as the "discovery rule.”
. See HRS § 657-20, quoted infra.
. HRS § 657-20 provides in relevant part as follows:
§ 657-20 Extension by fraudulent concealment.
If any person who is liable to any of the actions mentioned in this part or section 663-3, fraud1 ulently conceals the existence of the cause of action or the identity of any person who is liable for the claim from the knowledge of the person entitled to bring the action, the action may be commenced at any time within six years after the person who is entitled to bring the same discovers or should have discovered, the existence of the cause of action or the identity of the person who is liable for the claim, although the action would otherwise be barred by the period of limitations.
(Emphases added.)
. HRS § 651C-9 refers to "a fraudulent transfer or obligation.” Pursuant to HRS § 651C-4, either a "transfer made” or an "obligation incurred by a debtor" can be fraudulent. In this case, Petitioners are challenging the transfer of funds from RFI to HSC, and not an "obligation incurred” by RFI. Hence, the "obligation” language in HRS § 651C-9 is inapplicable to this case.
.Apparently as a part of the same argument, Petitioners cite
Hays v. City and County of Honolulu,
.
See, e.g., In re S. Health Care of Arkansas, Inc.,
.
See, e.g., McWilliams v. McWilliams,
.
See, e.g., Cendant Corp. v. Shelton,
.
See, e.g., Johnston v. Crook,
. HRS § 651C-10 provides as follows:
§ 651C-10 Supplement of provisions.
Unless displaced by the provisions of this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal and agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement its provisions.
(Emphases added.)
. In their Application, Petitioners state that “on September 7, 2005, Schmidts’ counsel wrote a demand letter to the Defendant shown in Exhibit 84 but there was no response." Petitioners further contend that "the undisputed facts are that RFI, by and through [Respondents], were concealing RFI’s financial condition and the 'upstream’ transfer of RFI’s assets to [Respondents]. Such conduct tolls the statute of limitations.” However, Petitioners do not cite any authority for this proposition, or cite any cases that explain *511 when the doctrine of fraudulent concealment applies in these circumstances.
.
See, e.g., Levy,
. Cortez maintains that the commentary to Section 7 of the UFTA cites Lind with approval. However, Section 7 enumerates the potential remedies available in UFTA actions. Section 7, therefore, has nothing to do with the statute of limitations set forth in Section 9.
The commentary to Section 7 cites Lind for the proposition that "the remedies specified in [Section 7] ... are cumulative.” 7A Uniform Laws Annotated, Part II at 157. Thus, the citation to Lind in the Commentary does not pertain to the date the statute of limitations begins to run.