Nathaniel Ogle v. Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Ass'n, 951 F.3d 794

Nathaniel Ogle, a nonmember employee of the Ohio Department of Taxation, had mandatory "fair-share" union fees deducted from his pay from July 2015 to Feb 2018 under Ohio law.
In July 2018 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Janus v. AFSCME, holding compulsory fair-share fees by public-sector unions unconstitutional under the First Amendment and overruling Abood.
Ogle filed a § 1983 class action against the union seeking refunds of fees collected pre-Janus.
The union moved to dismiss, asserting a good-faith defense based on reliance on Abood and state law; the district court granted dismissal.
The Sixth Circuit had recently held in Lee that unions may assert a good-faith defense for pre-Janus fee collections; this panel adhered to that precedent but addressed Ogle’s direct challenge to the defense.
The court grounded the defense in § 1983 interpretive principles and common-law analogies (particularly abuse of process), and affirmed dismissal while noting limits and unresolved questions about other discrimination contexts.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether unions can assert a good-faith defense to § 1983 claims seeking refunds of pre-Janus fair-share fees	Ogle: the good-faith defense is invalid and cannot bar recovery	Union: may assert good-faith reliance on Abood and Ohio law to avoid liability	Court: Good-faith defense valid here; affirms dismissal consistent with circuit precedent
Whether § 1983 permits common-law defenses/immunities for private parties	Ogle: § 1983 shouldn’t be read to allow this defense in his claim	Union: § 1983’s silence means courts look to common-law analogues for appropriate defenses	Court: § 1983 inquiry draws on common-law analogues (per Pierson, Malley, etc.); defense fits this framework
What common-law analogue governs (and its effect)	Ogle: challenges the analogy and its application	Union: abuse-of-process is the closest analogue, permitting a narrow good-faith defense	Court: Abuse-of-process analogy is plausible; a narrow good-faith defense applies to unions who reasonably relied on Abood/state law
Scope and limits of the defense, and panel authority to decide it	Ogle: defense should not bar recovery and panel should reject it	Union: panel must follow Lee and other circuits recognizing the defense	Court: Bound by Lee; affirms recognition of the defense but cautions against overbroad application to other discrimination contexts

Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (U.S. 2018) (overruled Abood; held compulsory fair-share fees unconstitutional)
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (U.S. 1977) (previously authorized public-sector fair-share fees)
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (U.S. 1992) (recognized that private parties may assert good-faith defenses in some § 1983 claims)
Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988) (Sixth Circuit precedent recognizing good-faith defenses to certain § 1983 claims)
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (U.S. 1967) (courts look to common law for guidance on immunities and defenses under § 1983)
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (U.S. 1981) (§ 1983 enacted against a backdrop of common-law principles)
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (U.S. 1986) (use of common-law analogues in determining immunities under § 1983)
Danielson v. Inslee, 945 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2019) (held unions may assert a good-faith defense for pre-Janus fee collections)
Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 942 F.3d 352 (7th Cir. 2019) (similar circuit-level holding recognizing the defense)
NLRB v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 644 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1981) (allowed recoupment for years of discriminatory charges under statutory scheme)