882 F.3d 1380
11th Cir.2018Background
- Natalia Cintron, an Argentine national and U.S. lawful permanent resident, pled guilty in 2009 to violating Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(c)1. (2007) (trafficking in specified narcotics).
- DHS initiated removal proceedings alleging her conviction made her ineligible for cancellation of removal as an "aggravated felony" under INA § 240A(a)(3).
- The BIA and immigration judge found the Florida statute divisible and that the record of conviction was inconclusive as to which alternative conduct supported the conviction, so Cintron could not prove she had not been convicted of an aggravated felony.
- Cintron petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review of the BIA decision denying cancellation of removal.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo whether her Florida conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under the categorical/modified categorical approach and whether the Florida statute was divisible (elements) or indivisible (means).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(c)1. is divisible (multiple elements) or indivisible (alternative means) | Cintron: statute is indivisible; alternatives are means of committing a single "trafficking" offense | Government: statute is divisible so the modified categorical approach applies | Held: statute is indivisible; alternatives are means, not separate elements |
| Whether a conviction under § 893.135(1)(c)1. categorically qualifies as an "aggravated felony" (drug trafficking crime) | Cintron: statute is categorically overbroad because it criminalizes mere possession (not a federal felony), so it cannot be an aggravated felony | Government: contends statute can be read as divisible and include conduct that matches federal drug-trafficking | Held: because statute is indivisible and its least conduct (possession) is not a federal drug-trafficking felony, conviction is not categorically an aggravated felony |
| Whether inconclusive conviction record (Shepard documents) bars relief if statute were divisible | Cintron: not reached because statute is indivisible; but argues she should not be disqualified | Government: relied on inconclusive record to argue ineligibility | Held: court did not decide broader Shepard-burden allocation issue but ruled indivisibility disposes the case in Cintron's favor |
| Whether Eleventh Circuit should defer to Florida courts’ characterization of statutory alternatives | Cintron: Florida caselaw treats alternatives as means; Eleventh Circuit must follow state law | Government: urged different reading and relied on other Florida statutes/caselaw | Held: followed Florida decisions and statutory text; bound to state courts’ determination that alternatives are means |
Key Cases Cited
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (explains categorical approach for immigration offenses)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (distinguishes categorical and modified categorical approaches)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (explains means vs. elements inquiry and use of state authority)
- Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (states’ characterization of statutory alternatives is controlling)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (limits documents usable under modified categorical approach)
- Donawa v. U.S. Atty Gen., 735 F.3d 1275 (Eleventh Circuit precedent on reviewing aggravated-felony questions)