Nat'l Ass'n v. Trump
298 F. Supp. 3d 209
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- DACA (2012) allowed certain undocumented immigrants brought to the U.S. as children to receive two‑year grants of deferred action and work authorization; it conferred no formal immigration status.
- In 2014 DHS considered but never implemented DAPA; related litigation (Texas v. United States) produced preliminary injunctions and an evenly divided Supreme Court affirmance of the Fifth Circuit judgment.
- On Sept. 5, 2017 Acting DHS Secretary Duke issued a five‑page Rescission Memo ending DACA prospectively, limiting renewals for a narrow window, and directing rejection of new initial applications; the Sessions Letter from the Attorney General advised rescission on legal/constitutional grounds and litigation risk.
- Multiple suits challenged the rescission; some district courts granted preliminary injunctions requiring DHS to accept renewals but not new initial applications; consolidated actions (including NAACP v. Trump and Princeton v. United States) raised APA and constitutional claims.
- The government argued lack of jurisdiction (8 U.S.C. §1252(g)), nonreviewability under the APA (5 U.S.C. §701(a)(2)), lack of standing, and that DHS’s rescission was lawful; plaintiffs sought summary judgment on APA claims (and limited injunctive relief on information‑sharing).
- The district court held it had jurisdiction, found the rescission reviewable, concluded DHS’s legal justification (statutory and constitutional) and litigation‑risk rationale were inadequately explained, and vacated the rescission but stayed vacatur 90 days to allow DHS to provide a fuller explanation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction under INA §1252(g) | §1252(g) does not bar review of a policy rescission that is not an actual removal proceeding | §1252(g) bars challenges that are "a step toward" removal and would interfere with removal scheme | §1252(g) does not apply; rescission is not commencement/adjudication/execution of removal proceedings (AAADC followed) |
| Article III / associational standing | At least one individual plaintiff (Perales Sanchez) has standing; organizational plaintiffs have associational standing via member declarations | Government contests organizational plaintiffs' standing and non‑individual plaintiffs in Princeton/Microsoft | At least one plaintiff has standing for each claim; NAACP and unions meet associational standing germane test |
| Reviewability under APA §701(a)(2) (Chaney presumption) | Rescission is a general enforcement policy based on legal interpretation and thus reviewable; litigation‑risk rationale is not independently insulating | DHS argues Chaney presumption applies to nonenforcement decisions and rescission is an enforcement choice, some based on litigation risk | Court: Chaney presumption rebutted — rescission was a general enforcement policy grounded in legal conclusion; litigation‑risk justification was inseparable from the legal judgment and insufficient to trigger nonreviewability |
| Substantive APA (arbitrary & capricious) | DHS failed adequately to explain why DACA was unlawful, did not address reliance interests, and overstated litigation risk; rescission arbitrary and capricious | DHS relied on Sessions Letter, Texas litigation, and litigation risk to justify rescission | Held: DHS's legal reasoning was too meager; failed to consider reliance interests; litigation‑risk claim implausible — rescission arbitrary and capricious; vacatur ordered but stayed 90 days for agency explanation |
| Notice‑and‑comment / Procedural APA & RFA | Plaintiffs: rescission was substantive rule requiring notice and comment; RFA analysis required | DHS: rescission is a general policy statement exempt from notice and comment; RFA not implicated for plaintiffs | Rescission ruled a general statement of policy — notice‑and‑comment claim dismissed; NAACP's RFA claim dismissed for lack of standing as a "small entity" |
| Information‑sharing / Due Process (preliminary injunction) | Plaintiffs seek injunction preventing DHS from using DACA application data for immigration enforcement after prior assurances | DHS says its information‑sharing policy unchanged and it retains right to modify; allegations speculative | Court denied preliminary injunction: plaintiffs showed persuasive legal theory but failed to show imminent irreparable harm; also dismissed info‑sharing claim for failure to state a claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Reno v. American–Arab Anti‑Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (§1252(g) interpreted narrowly; covers only three listed actions)
- Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (nonenforcement decisions presumptively unreviewable under §701(a)(2))
- Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (agency must provide reasoned explanation; arbitrary and capricious standard)
- Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) (agency reversing prior policy must give reasoned explanation, address reliance)
- Crowley Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (distinguishes individual nonenforcement decisions from reviewable general enforcement policies based on statutory interpretation)
- OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (agency adoption of longstanding general enforcement policy may be reviewable)
- ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270 (1987) (agency refusal to reconsider held committed to agency discretion; dicta on enforcing legal rulings in nonenforcement contexts)
- Regents of the University of California v. DHS, 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (district court preliminary injunction; disposition on related APA claims)
- Batalla Vidal v. Duke, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (preliminary injunction and APA analysis)
- Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (DAPA decision; court examined notice‑and‑comment and statutory conflict arguments)