Nash v. Stevens
144 Conn. App. 1
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2013Background
- In 1977 Chary D. Nash deeded a "first piece" to her son and granted an option (for $1) to purchase two additional parcels ("second" and "third piece"); no performance date appeared in the recorded deed.
- The son (H. Franklin Nash, Jr.) immediately conveyed the first piece and the option to himself and his wife (plaintiff Carol Ann Nash).
- Chary died in 2009; the plaintiff attempted to exercise the option in 2010 and sued for specific performance in 2010 after executors (defendants) refused.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing the option was time-barred under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47-33a(a) (default: 18 months if no performance date).
- The trial court excluded a handwritten contemporaneous note (purportedly signed by Chary) as unauthenticated and held § 47-33a’s 18-month default ran from the 1977 execution date; summary judgment for defendants was entered.
- Majority affirmed: § 47-33a’s 18-month default applies where the agreement contains no performance date; parol evidence/extrinsic intent was not permitted because the recorded option was unambiguous and the handwritten note was not authenticated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does § 47-33a time period begin for an option with no date of performance? | Time begins when option is exercised (plaintiff relied on Texaco/Battalino). | Time begins at execution of the agreement (May 16, 1977); plaintiff’s 2010 exercise is untimely. | Held for defendants: where no performance date appears, § 47-33a’s 18-month period runs from execution. |
| Whether trial court should have admitted extrinsic evidence of parties’ intent (affidavits / handwritten note) to show a performance date | Nash: contemporaneous oral/written agreement fixed the trigger (death of grantors); court should consider intent/parol evidence. | Defs: recorded option is unambiguous; § 47-33a precludes looking to extrinsic intent when agreement is silent. | Held for defendants: contract language was clear; court properly limited analysis to the instrument. |
| Admissibility / authentication of the handwritten contemporaneous note | Nash: note was produced in discovery, bore grantor’s signature and corroborated affidavits; admissible or at least raised a triable issue. | Defs: note unauthenticated; plaintiff failed to establish genuineness. | Held for defendants: trial court did not abuse discretion excluding the note for lack of admissible authentication. |
| Whether Texaco/Battalino control (option in lease not time-barred until exercise) | Nash: Texaco and Battalino allow the statute not to run until option ripens or is exercised. | Defs: those cases involve long-term leases with explicit ripening provisions and are distinguishable. | Held for defendants: Texaco/Battalino distinguishable; those involved lease-based ripening provisions, not a bare option without a trigger. |
Key Cases Cited
- Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc. v. Samowitz, 213 Conn. 676 (1990) (held § 47-33a did not bar specific performance where option in long-term lease did not ripen until years later)
- Battalino v. Van Patten, 100 Conn. App. 155 (2007) (applied Texaco to a lease/option context where option did not take effect until lease conditions were met)
- McNeil v. Riccio, 45 Conn. App. 466 (1997) (general rule: specific performance claim must be brought within one year of specified date or within 18 months of contract execution if no date)
- Funaro v. Baisley, 57 Conn. App. 636 (2000) (death of grantor can trigger the time for performance where instrument so provides)
- TIE Communications, Inc. v. Kopp, 218 Conn. 281 (1991) (parol evidence rule principles and exceptions; extrinsic evidence admissible to supplement or show writing not integrated)
- Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Pastena, 52 Conn. App. 318 (1999) (clarifying when written instrument’s definite language forecloses extrinsic evidence)