Narvaez v. United States, 641 F.3d 877

In 2003 Narvaez pled guilty to bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and was designated a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on two Wisconsin escape convictions (failure to return to confinement, Wis. Stat. § 946.42(3)(a)).
The career offender designation raised Narvaez’s sentencing range from 100–125 months to 151–188 months, and he was sentenced to 170 months’ imprisonment.
Five years later, the Supreme Court issued Begay v. United States and Chambers v. United States, clarifying the meaning of “violent felony” and limiting certain sentencing enhancements.
Narvaez moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) asserting Begay and Chambers render his prior convictions non-violent for career-offender purposes; the district court denied relief and issued a certificate of appealability.
The government conceded Begay and Chambers apply retroactively and that Narvaez’s escape convictions no longer qualify as crimes of violence for purposes of the career-offender guideline, but contested the certificate and the relief requested.
The Seventh Circuit ultimately held that Begay and Chambers apply retroactively, that Narvaez’s sentence was illegal as a result, and remanded for resentencing without the career-offender designation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Retroactivity of Begay and Chambers	Narvaez argues Begay and Chambers apply retroactively on collateral review.	Narvaez’s argument is acknowledged but procedural issues tied to the COA remain.	Yes; Begay and Chambers apply retroactively on collateral review.
Miscarriage of justice from career-offender designation	The postconviction law clarifications show Narvaez was never eligible for career offender status.	The sentence range and designation were within statutory bounds and due process was not violated absent a miscarriage.	There was a miscarriage of justice; Narvaez is entitled to § 2255 relief and resentencing without career-offender status.
Certificate of appealability	Narvaez's claim presents a substantial constitutional question due to the misapplication of law.	GA argues no substantial constitutional question identified in COA.	The COA issue is satisfied; the claim warrants appellate consideration and relief for the substantive error.

Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (U.S. 2008) (limits violent-felony categorization; substantive retroactivity impact on collateral review)
Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (U.S. 2009) (interprets 'violent felony' vs. passive offenses; retroactivity on collateral review)
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (U.S. 1974) (subsequent legislative reinterpretation may render conviction unlawful; miscarriage of justice)
Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2010) (substantive retroactivity of Begay–Chambers on collateral review)
Templeton v. United States, 543 F.3d 378 (7th Cir. 2008) (textual alignment of ACCA and Guidelines definitions of crimes of violence)