Narinder Singh v. Attorney General United States, 807 F.3d 547

Singh, an Indian national and LPR since 1994, was convicted in 2000 of crimes involving fraud/counterfeiting (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1546).
He departed and was readmitted to the U.S. on January 20, 2003; his 2003 entry was later characterized as procedurally regular but substantively inadmissible.
In 2010 Singh was served a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging removability based on his 2000 conviction (a crime involving moral turpitude); he conceded removability.
Singh applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which requires 7 years of continuous residence after admission; IJ denied relief as he lacked the 7-year period, and the BIA affirmed.
Singh argued the 7-year clock restarted after his 2003 lawful reentry; the government and the agency concluded the 2000 conviction permanently stopped the clock because it was the basis for the NTA.
The Third Circuit denied review, holding Nelson controls so the clock stopped in 2000 and did not restart on 2003 reentry, rendering Singh ineligible for cancellation.

Issue	Singh's Argument	Government/BIA Argument	Held
Whether the §1229b(a)(2) seven-year continuous residence clock can restart after reentry when an earlier conviction stopped the clock and the later NTA alleges that conviction	Reentry (and continued residence thereafter) restarts the seven-year clock	A clock-stopping offense that is alleged as basis for removal in the NTA permanently terminates any later accrual of continuous residence	Held: Clock did not restart; Nelson controls — conviction stopped clock in 2000 and precluded later accrual
Proper method to count the 7-year period (anniversary v. calendar) given close timing	Calendar method gives sufficient time	Anniversary method would fall short	Held: Court did not decide method because case resolved on Nelson ground
Whether Singh’s 2000 convictions render him removable as an alien inadmissible for crime involving moral turpitude	Singh conceded removability; no contest	Charges render him inadmissible/removable	Held: Singh is removable; conviction qualifies as crime involving moral turpitude
Standard of review/deference to BIA single-member decision	Aim to review legal conclusions de novo subject to deference	Agency interpretations receive Chevron deference when reasonable; single-member BIA decisions are persuasive authority only	Held: Court applied persuasive/deferential review and followed precedent (Nelson) entitled to Chevron-style deference

Okeke v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 585 (3d Cir. 2005) (held lawful reentry after a clock-stopping offense can restart the seven-year clock where the NTA did not charge the alien with that offense)
Nelson v. Attorney General, 685 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2012) (contrasted with Okeke; held that when the NTA alleges the clock-stopping offense as basis for removal, the clock does not restart)
Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (U.S. 2012) (admission defined as lawful entry; seven-year clock begins at admission)
De Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 633 (3d Cir. 2002) (crimes involving dishonesty/fraud qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude)
Briseno-Flores v. Attorney General, 492 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2007) (BIA decisions and interpretation of continuous residence/cancellation issues)
Pareja v. Attorney General, 615 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2010) (alien bears burden to show eligibility for cancellation)