NANCY G. SLUTSKY VS. KENNETH J. SLUTSKYÂ (FM-14-1535-08, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(CONSOLIDATED), 167 A.3d 660

Background

Thirty-year marriage; Nancy Slutsky (plaintiff) sued for divorce in May 2008; trial was held in January–February 2014 and the final judgment of divorce was entered May 30, 2014 (with post-judgment orders in July 2014 and later).
Disputes focused on (1) whether funds advanced from family trusts to Kenneth Slutsky (defendant) were loans requiring repayment or trust distributions/gifts; (2) the valuation and distributable share of defendant’s equity-partner interest in a large law firm (including whether individual goodwill existed and its valuation); (3) whether two IRAs were premarital and therefore exempt from equitable distribution; and (4) an award of plaintiff’s counsel fees and expert costs and enforcement of that award by plaintiff’s former counsel.
Extensive expert testimony: plaintiff’s expert (Hirschfeld) assigned a TCA value plus a goodwill component to defendant’s partner interest; defendant’s expert (Hoberman) disputed a separate goodwill component and computed a different TCA value. Hirschfeld later revised downward some numbers during redirect.
Trial judge found defendant generally credible, rejected the claim that plaintiff must reimburse family-trust advances (finding defendant failed to prove enforceable repayment obligations), accepted that the IRAs were premarital at trial but reversed that finding on reconsideration, awarded plaintiff equitable distribution (including half of the law‑firm valuation as adopted by the judge), and awarded plaintiff significant counsel fees plus expert costs.
On appeal the Appellate Division: affirmed the rejection of an obligation to repay family-trust advances and affirmed denial of additional retroactive pendente lite relief; reversed the law‑firm valuation and the percentage award (vacating those provisions for remand), reversed the post-judgment order treating the IRAs as marital (vacating that relief), reversed the counsel‑fee award (but affirmed the expert-cost award), and reversed the enforcement order so that fee enforcement and related actions must be revisited on remand (including fee arbitration issues). The matter is remanded to a newly assigned Family Part judge.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are family-trust transfers loans requiring marital allocation?	Slutsky denied knowledge of enforceable loans; argued funds were not loans for which plaintiff should be charged.	Kenneth argued large sums (~$1.9M) were loans to support the marriage and must be repaid (shared).	Court affirmed: defendant failed to prove enforceable loan repayment obligations; no equitable charge against plaintiff.
Value and equitable distribution of defendant’s law‑firm interest (including goodwill)	Plaintiff sought half the value based on expert valuation that included goodwill and TCA.	Defendant argued (through expert) only TCA should be valued, no separate individual goodwill, and the judge erred in adopting Hirschfeld’s original figures after Hirschfeld reduced them.	Reversed: trial court failed to make required specific findings on goodwill and relied on an expert’s initial numbers despite revisions; valuation and percentage award vacated and remanded for new judge.
Are Union Central and Wells Fargo IRAs premarital (thus exempt)?	Plaintiff challenged premarital claim.	Defendant presented testimony and cancelled checks he said showed premarital funding/titling.	Reversed (vacated the post-judgment order changing the trial finding): the trial judge’s inconsistent findings lacked adequate explanation; the premarital/IRA issue must be reconsidered on remand.
Award and enforcement of plaintiff’s counsel fees and expert costs; standing of plaintiff’s former counsel to enforce	Slutsky sought full fee payment; counsel petitioned to enforce the fee award and obtain payment into counsel’s trust account.	Kenneth argued counsel lacked standing and the petition improperly sought to collect the client’s entire recovery; also contested reasonableness.	Mixed: expert costs affirmed; counsel‑fee award reversed because it rested on vacated findings and factual errors (and because pending fee arbitration/stipulation affects collectibility). Enforcement order vacated; counsel may have standing to seek unpaid fees but collection must await proper determination (and fee arbitration).

Key Cases Cited

Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 (N.J. 1998) (appellate deference to Family Part factfinding when supported by substantial credible evidence)
Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480 (N.J. 1981) (court should not disturb a trial court's findings when supported by credible evidence)
Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423 (N.J. 1983) (discusses when attorney goodwill is property subject to equitable distribution and sets out a valuation approach)
Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340 (N.J. 1975) (treatment of partnership interest valuation and presumption where firm books are reliable)
Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219 (N.J. 1974) (equitable-distribution framework: identify marital assets, value them, and make an equitable allocation)
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474 (N.J. 1974) (reversal warranted when findings are manifestly unsupported by credible evidence)
Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229 (N.J. 1971) (attorneys have standing as unpaid solicitors to press fee applications to avoid unjust enrichment of the opposing party)