Nancy Buccina v. Linda Ann Grimsby, 889 F.3d 256

Nancy and Scot Buccina sued Linda Grimsby after Nancy was injured when Grimsby’s 17‑foot boat hit a wake on the Maumee River/Lake Erie, invoking diversity and admiralty jurisdiction.
The Buccinas pleaded that the action “is not to be deemed an ‘admiralty and maritime claim’” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9, preserving a jury trial under diversity procedures.
The district court previously held the incident fell within admiralty jurisdiction and addressed related interlocutory issues; a jury later found Grimsby not negligent.
The district court granted the Buccinas’ motion for a new trial; Grimsby appealed and the Buccinas cross‑appealed from that nonfinal order.
The parties invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (an interlocutory admiralty‑appeal statute) as a basis for appellate jurisdiction.
The Sixth Circuit held that because the Buccinas elected to proceed under ordinary civil (diversity) procedures via their Rule 9(h) designation, § 1292(a)(3) does not apply and the appeals must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Buccina)	Defendant's Argument (Grimsby)	Held
Whether § 1292(a)(3) permits interlocutory appeal of the district court’s new‑trial order	Case is an admiralty case; statute allows interlocutory appeals in admiralty matters	If plaintiffs elected to proceed under diversity/civil procedures, §1292(a)(3) is inapplicable	Held: §1292(a)(3) does not apply because plaintiffs chose ordinary civil (diversity) procedures via Rule 9(h) statement; appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Whether invoking admiralty jurisdiction in the complaint alone makes the case an “admiralty case” for §1292(a)(3)	Admiralty invocation in complaint suffices to treat it as admiralty for interlocutory appeal purposes	Rule 9(h) designation controls procedural posture; plaintiffs explicitly disclaimed admiralty treatment	Held: A 9(h) designation (or its absence) controls; mere invocation of admiralty jurisdiction is not enough
Whether the jury trial resulted from consent under Rule 39(c) (allowing jury in admiralty)	Buccinas suggested Rule 9(h) designation was withdrawn and/or both parties consented to jury trial	Grimsby contends jury was not by mutual consent but because plaintiffs proceeded under diversity	Held: Record shows Buccinas chose diversity procedures to secure a jury; no evidence they later re‑designated the case as admiralty or that a jury was by mutual consent under Rule 39(c)

Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33 (per curiam) (final‑judgment requirement for appeals)
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (admiralty jurisdiction test)
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (nexus of boating torts to maritime activity)
Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (distinction between uniform substantive maritime law and nonuniform procedural choices)
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (application of federal maritime substantive law)
Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355 (permitting admiralty claims to proceed under diversity with jury)
Luera v. M/V Alberta, 635 F.3d 181 (Rule 9(h) consequences and admiralty procedure choice)