Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159

Background

Michael Nance was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Georgia; Georgia statute authorizes lethal injection as the sole method of execution.
Nance filed a 42 U.S.C. §1983 suit seeking to enjoin his execution by lethal injection, alleging his veins and medication use create a substantial risk of severe pain if injected.
As his readily available alternative, Nance proposed execution by firing squad, a method authorized in four other States.
The Eleventh Circuit treated Nance’s §1983 complaint as a habeas petition, reasoning that because Georgia law is fixed (authorizing only injection), enjoining injection would necessarily prevent his execution and thus must be pursued in habeas; it dismissed the claim as second or successive.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding §1983 remains a proper vehicle for method-of-execution claims even when the proposed alternative is not currently authorized by the State’s statute, and remanded for further proceedings (including timeliness).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Appropriate procedural vehicle: whether a method-of-execution claim proposing an alternative not authorized by state statute must be brought in habeas rather than §1983	Nance: §1983 is proper because he challenges the method of carrying out the sentence (not the sentence itself) and supplies a feasible alternative (firing squad) that would allow the State to execute him by a different means	State: Because Georgia law authorizes only lethal injection, enjoining injection would necessarily prevent enforcement of the death sentence, so the claim must be in habeas	Held: §1983 is appropriate; proposing an out-of-state alternative does not convert the claim into habeas because relief would not necessarily bar execution—the State could amend law to implement the alternative
Effect of state law ‘fixedness’: whether courts must treat current state execution statutes as immutable when choosing the vehicle	Nance: State law need not be treated as immutable; courts can order relief that would require the State to change its law, and §1983 routinely does so	State/Eleventh Cir.: Relief that renders the State unable to lawfully execute under current statute necessarily implies invalidity of the sentence	Held: Federal courts should not treat state statutes as immutable for the vehicle question; §1983 may compel changes in state law without converting the claim into habeas
Scope of Bucklew and alternative-method requirement: whether Bucklew’s permission to propose out-of-state alternatives is illusory if such claims must be brought in habeas	Nance: Bucklew allows prisoners to propose methods not authorized by the executing State; forcing habeas would nullify that right and produce arbitrary state-by-state results	State: (implicitly) Bucklew does not authorize circumventing habeas when state law forecloses implementation	Held: Bucklew remains effective; requiring habeas in such circumstances would thwart Bucklew and create unjustified disparities among States

Key Cases Cited

Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004) (method-of-execution challenge may proceed under §1983 where relief would not prevent execution).
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006) (same principle; challenge to lethal-injection protocol fits §1983 when State could still carry out execution).
Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. _ (2019) (Eighth Amendment requires prisoner to identify a feasible, readily implemented alternative; prisoner may propose methods not presently authorized by the State).
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§1983 claim barred where success would necessarily imply invalidity of conviction or sentence).
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (recognizing §1983’s implicit exception for claims in the core of habeas corpus).
Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015) (Eighth Amendment test for method-of-execution claims: substantial risk of severe pain and identification of an available alternative).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (one of §1983’s aims is to override state laws that violate federal rights).