Nairn D. Newell v. Florida Department of Corrections
214 So. 3d 721
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Petitioner Nairn D. Newell (pro se) seeks an order compelling the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) to grant a one-time 60-day incentive gain-time award for completing a G.E.D.
- FDOC denied consideration, concluding § 944.275(4)(d) (60-day educational award) does not apply to inmates whose offenses were committed on or after October 1, 1995.
- The FDOC’s position rested on reading the 10-day-per-month cap in § 944.275(4)(b)3 and the omission of (b)3 from the subsection (d) „notwithstanding" clause to exclude post‑Oct. 1, 1995 offenders.
- Petitioner sought certiorari relief after the circuit court denied mandamus; this court has jurisdiction under Sheley v. Florida Parole Commission.
- The court held FDOC has statutory authority to grant the 60-day award in its discretion and that FDOC had a ministerial duty to at least consider Newell’s request, subject to the 85% service limitation in (b)3.
Issues
| Issue | Newell's Argument | FDOC's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FDOC must consider granting the one-time 60-day educational gain-time for offenses committed on/after Oct. 1, 1995 | Newell: § 944.275(4)(d) authorizes a 60-day award for qualifying inmates; FDOC must consider it | FDOC: The 10-day/month cap in (b)3 and omission from (d)’s notwithstanding clause means (d) does not apply to post‑Oct. 1, 1995 offenses | Court: FDOC must consider the request; (d) remains available in discretion, subject to the 85% requirement in (b)3 |
| Whether (d) is impliedly repealed or overridden by later-added (b)3 | Newell: (d) survives; (b)3 cannot implicitly repeal (d) | FDOC: (b)3’s 10-day limit and omission from (d) imply (d) was excluded for post‑1995 offenses | Court: Repeal by implication disfavored; (d) was enacted before (b)3 and should be given effect unless clear conflict exists |
| Whether the 60-day award can be applied if it would reduce service below 85% | Newell: Did not allege an 85% conflict here | FDOC: Even if (d) applied, it cannot cause a prisoner to serve less than 85% under (b)3 | Court: Agrees — (d) cannot be applied to reduce service below 85%, but otherwise FDOC has discretion to grant it |
| Proper remedy for FDOC’s refusal to consider petition | Newell: Mandamus/certiorari to compel consideration | FDOC: No authority to consider; lower court denied relief | Court: Granted certiorari, quashed lower order, remanded for FDOC to consider request |
Key Cases Cited
- Sheley v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 703 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA) (jurisdictional basis for certiorari review)
- Perez v. McNeil, 995 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA) (discusses interplay of educational award and 85% rule; concurrence analyzing alternative statutory readings)
- Carcaise v. Durden, 382 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA) (repeal by implication disfavored)
- Oldham v. Rooks, 361 So. 2d 140 (Fla.) (presumption that later statutes are enacted with knowledge of prior laws; give each statute field of operation)
- State ex rel. Gerstein v. Hialeah Race Course, Inc., 245 So. 2d 53 (Fla.) (statutes addressing same subject should be given effect unless repugnancy is clear)