939 F.3d 470
2d Cir.2019Background
- Plaintiffs (NAACP, its Connecticut conference, and five individuals) challenged Connecticut’s 2011 redistricting plan for counting incarcerated people in the prison district rather than their pre‑incarceration home district, alleging racialized vote‑dilution in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s “one person, one vote.”
- Most incarcerated persons in Connecticut cannot vote in the prison district and may vote only in their home district; plaintiffs allege this practice inflates representation in largely White rural prison districts and dilutes representation in predominantly Black and Latino urban home districts.
- Defendants (Connecticut’s Governor and Secretary of State, sued in official capacities) moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6), arguing Eleventh Amendment immunity (claims frivolous/insubstantial) and that the claim presents nonjusticiable political questions; district court denied dismissal under Eleventh Amendment, invoking Ex parte Young.
- On interlocutory appeal the Second Circuit held it had jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity and reviewed whether the complaint plausibly alleged an ongoing federal violation within Ex parte Young.
- The Second Circuit concluded plaintiffs’ constitutional claim was not frivolous or insubstantial and that prospective relief is sought, so Ex parte Young applies; it affirmed denial of the Eleventh Amendment defense but held the single judge lacked authority to decide the Rule 12(b)(6) merits and remanded for referral to a three‑judge district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eleventh Amendment / Ex parte Young jurisdiction | Complaint alleges ongoing Fourteenth Amendment violation and seeks prospective relief (declaratory/injunctive) | Claims are frivolous/insubstantial so Eleventh Amendment bars suit | Ex parte Young applies; claim not frivolous/insubstantial; Eleventh Amendment does not bar this suit |
| Effect of Evenwel (total population baseline) | Counting prisoners at home would remedy dilution of urban minority representation | Evenwel permits states to use total population (Census) and plans under 10% deviation presumptively comply | Evenwel does not foreclose pleading stage; 10% rule is evidentiary, not a pleading bar |
| Justiciability / political question doctrine | Population‑inequality equal‑protection claim is judicially manageable | Defendants say question of “fair representation” is nonjusticiable political issue | Claim is justiciable; Rucho does not foreclose population‑based equal‑protection claims |
| Three‑judge court requirement & Rule 12(b)(6) ruling | Plaintiff seeks statewide legislative apportionment relief under § 2284(a) | District judge proceeded on Rule 12(b)(6) without convening three judges | Single judge correctly decided Ex parte Young jurisdictionally but improperly ruled on 12(b)(6); case must be referred to a three‑judge court on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (creates exception allowing prospective suits against state officers to enjoin ongoing federal violations)
- Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016) (states may draw districts using total population from the Census)
- Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Equal Protection requires population‑based legislative apportionment)
- Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983) (discusses when population deviation creates prima facie discrimination)
- Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (population deviations under 10% are generally minor)
- Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966) (legislative apportionment is subject to constitutional challenge if it cancels voting strength)
- Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) (federal review of redistricting is a serious intrusion but permissible for constitutional violations)
- Davidson v. City of Cranston, 837 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 2016) (challenged prisoner‑based counting; persuasive but not controlling on whether claim is insubstantial)
- Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015) (three‑judge court requirement is jurisdictional; single judge must refer when § 2284(a) applies)
- Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable, but population inequality claims remain justiciable)
- Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) (collateral order doctrine permits immediate appeal of nonfinal orders denying Eleventh Amendment immunity)
- In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612 (2d Cir. 2007) (standard for reviewing Ex parte Young jurisdictional allegations)
- Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (prima facie evidentiary standards are not pleading requirements)
- S. New England Tel. Co. v. Glob. NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (defines ‘insubstantial’ claims that may be dismissed for jurisdictional deficiency)
- CSX Transp., Inc. v. N.Y. State Office of Real Prop. Servs., 306 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2002) (standard of review for Eleventh Amendment immunity rulings)