Myers v. Illinois Central Railroad, 629 F.3d 639

Background

Timothy Myers worked for the Illinois Central Railroad for nearly thirty years performing physically demanding tasks (brakeman, switchman, conductor).
He developed cumulative trauma injuries (elbow, knee, back, neck) starting around 2004–2006, requiring multiple surgeries.
Myers sued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, alleging the railroad's negligence caused his injuries.
Before trial, Myers offered four experts (three physicians and an ergonomist) to prove causation.
The district court, citing Daubert, excluded the four experts and granted summary judgment for the Railroad.
On appeal, Myers contends the district court erred in excluding the experts and in requiring expert causation evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether expert testimony is required to prove specific causation under FELA.	Myers contends general causation by an ergonomist suffices for jury to infer causation.	The railroad argues lay jurors cannot discern specific causation in CTDs and expert testimony is necessary.	Yes; Myers must prove specific causation via expert testimony, and lack thereof supports summary judgment.
Whether the district court properly excluded physicians' testimony under Daubert.	Physicians used differential diagnosis/etiology; exclusions were improper and should be tested on cross-examination.	The physicians' opinions were unreliable due to lack of patient work history and medical context.	The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the physicians' testimony under Daubert.
Whether a differential etiology is a reliable Daubert method in this context.	Differential etiology is a valid method to determine causation among multiple potential causes.	The physicians did not perform differential etiology and relied on a hunch about work-related causes.	Differential etiology must be properly conducted; here the physicians did not, so exclusion was proper.
Whether the ergonomist's general causation testimony could suffice without injury-specific causation.	Kress could testify to dangers of yard conditions; jury could infer specific causation.	General causation without ruling in/out specific causes cannot establish Myers's injuries.	No; general causation without specific causation cannot survive summary judgment.

Key Cases Cited

Gutierrez v. Excel Corp., 106 F.3d 683 (5th Cir.1997) (CTD causation familiar factors; wear and tear framework)
Brooks v. Union Pacific R. Co., 620 F.3d 896 (8th Cir.2010) (expert necessary for degenerative conditions)
Claar v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir.1994) (expert needed to establish causation under FELA)
Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665 (6th Cir.2010) (differential etiology discussed; case cited for methodology)
Walker v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581 (7th Cir.2000) (allow inaccuracies in history to be explored on cross-examination)
Happel v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 602 F.3d 820 (7th Cir.2010) (Daubert reliability framework; differential diagnosis discussion)
Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316 (7th Cir.1996) (courtroom is not the place for scientific guesswork)