Murr v. Wisconsin
137 S. Ct. 1933
| SCOTUS | 2017Background
- The Murr family owned two adjacent river lots (Lots E and F) in St. Croix County, Wisconsin; each had <1 acre of buildable land due to topography, and together still had <1 acre of buildable land.
- Wisconsin rules (and the county ordinance) require a minimum of 1 acre of buildable land to use lots as separate building sites, include a grandfather clause for substandard lots in separate ownership as of 1976, and a merger provision that adjacent lots under common ownership cannot be sold or developed separately.
- The Murrs acquired Lot F (1994) and Lot E (1995), then sought variances to move a cabin and to sell Lot E separately; the county board denied variances and state courts upheld that the lots were effectively merged.
- The Murrs sued claiming the merger regulation effected a regulatory taking of Lot E (depriving it of all or nearly all economically beneficial use); appraisals differed sharply on Lot E’s standalone value versus the combined parcel value.
- The Wisconsin trial court and court of appeals treated Lots E and F as a single parcel and held no compensable taking; the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper unit of property (denominator) for takings analysis | Murr: parcel should be Lot E alone (lot lines define parcel) | State: consider combined Lots E+F because merger rule and common ownership make them one parcel | Court: multifactor, objective test; consider state law treatment, physical characteristics, and prospective value — here treat Lots E+F as one parcel |
| Whether regulation constituted a per se taking (total deprivation) | Murr: regulation denies all economically beneficial use of Lot E (so Lucas applies) | State: owner retains residential use across combined parcel; not all economic use lost | Held: Not a Lucas taking; owners retained substantial use/value of combined parcel |
| Whether Penn Central balancing supports a taking | Murr: economic impact and investment-backed expectations support a taking | State: limited economic impact, expectations unreasonable because regulation predated or applied when lots were unified | Held: Under Penn Central factors, no compensable taking (economic impact small; expectations unreasonable; character of regulation legitimate) |
| Role of state law in defining property unit | Murr: lot lines/state definitions should control parcel determination | State: state law (merger) is relevant but parcel definition should also include other objective factors | Held: State law is important but not dispositive; courts must weigh state law treatment along with physical characteristics and value relationships to define parcel for takings analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (land-use regulation can be a taking if it goes too far)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (multi-factor balancing test for non-categorical regulatory takings)
- Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (categorical rule: total loss of economically beneficial use is a taking, with background-law exception)
- Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (state-law-created restrictions do not automatically bar takings claims; expectations assessed objectively)
- Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (rejects dividing property into time segments; cautions against circular parcel definitions)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (clarified scope of regulatory takings tests and rejected Agins test)
- Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (denominator question and importance of defining the relevant parcel)
- Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (portion taken is taken in its entirety; relevant parcel question reaffirmed)