901 F.3d 578
5th Cir.2018Background
- Murphy was convicted in Texas of capital murder for abducting and killing 80‑year‑old Bertie Cunningham; jury sentenced him to death after finding future-dangerousness and insufficient mitigation.
- At penalty phase defense called psychologist Dr. Mary Connell, who administered MMPI‑2 and MCMI‑3; interpretive reports (generated by computerized systems associated with Drs. Butcher and Millon) contained unfavorable hypotheses which the State emphasized as statements of those named psychologists.
- Defense did not elicit on redirect that the reports were computer‑generated interpretive outputs rather than direct, personal evaluations by Drs. Butcher or Millon; defense strategy focused on mitigation and on contesting the reports’ conclusions as hypothetical.
- Post‑conviction, Murphy’s counsel discovered that a State witness (Sheryl Wilhelm) said the lead prosecutor had allegedly confirmed her identification in a pretrial visit; Murphy claimed the State suppressed this impeachment evidence.
- State habeas courts dismissed or denied Murphy’s state applications (some claims deemed abusive of the writ); federal habeas denied; COA granted limited to (1) penalty‑phase ineffective assistance for failure to correct misleading expert impression and (2) Brady suppression of the prosecutor–Wilhelm pretrial conversation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ineffective assistance at penalty phase for not clarifying that MMPI‑2/MCMI‑3 reports were computer‑generated (failure to correct false impression) | Murphy: counsel should have exposed that Drs. Butcher and Millon did not personally author or review the reports; failing to do so was deficient and prejudicial given State’s summation relying on those named experts | State: counsel reasonably pursued a mitigation‑focused strategy, relied on their test‑administering expert, and had no clear red flag to require further investigation; any failure was strategic and not prejudicial amid overwhelming evidence of dangerousness | Denied — performance not deficient and no Strickland prejudice; no federal evidentiary hearing required |
| Brady suppression of impeachment evidence (prosecutor allegedly confirmed Wilhelm’s ID pretrial) | Murphy: prosecutor’s oral confirmation (undisclosed) would have impeached Wilhelm’s courtroom ID and undermined State’s future‑dangerousness proof | State: (and state courts) the conversation was not materially impeaching, was cumulative, and the claim was also procedurally defaulted as an abuse of the writ | Denied — procedurally barred and, in any event, not Brady‑material because marginal and cumulative |
| Request for federal evidentiary hearing to develop counsel’s knowledge/strategy | Murphy: hearing needed to show counsel either knew or did not know about report origins, which bears on deficiency and prejudice | State: existing record suffices; even assuming Murphy’s preferred facts, Strickland fails on both prongs | Denied — district court did not abuse discretion; even assuming favorable facts Murphy cannot show deficiency or prejudice |
| Cumulative prejudice from multiple errors | Murphy: cumulative effect of alleged Strickland and Brady errors warrants relief | State: Brady claim procedurally barred; in any event no individual errors proven, so nothing to cumulate | Denied — argument forfeited below; even on merits no cumulative prejudice shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance standard)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution duty to disclose favorable evidence)
- Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (high bar for deficiency under Strickland)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (deference to reasonable strategic choices by counsel)
- Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) (district court discretion to deny evidentiary hearing when record sufficient)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel must investigate or make reasonable strategic decision not to)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (consider tactical reasons for counsel’s choices and limits of federal review)
- Miller‑El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (standard for rebutting state‑court factual findings)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard for undisclosed evidence)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality assessed in light of cumulative suppressed evidence)