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560 S.W.3d 105
Tex.
2018
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Background

  • Two essentially identical 2009 oil-and-gas leases for adjacent 302‑acre tracts included an "offset" clause triggered when an adjacent producing well is completed within 467 feet; lessee (Murphy) then must within 120 days either (1) commence drilling an offset well on the leased acreage to a depth testing the same formation, (2) pay compensatory royalties, or (3) release acreage.
  • Comstock drilled the Lucas horizontal well in the Eagle Ford Shale 350 feet from the lease boundary, triggering the clause.
  • Murphy drilled the Herbst horizontal well on the leased acreage within 120 days and tested the Eagle Ford formation, but its lateral and perforations were ~1,800–2,100 feet from the lease line/triggering well; Murphy paid royalties on production.
  • Lessors/royalty owners (Herbst) sued for breach, arguing an offset well must be located close enough to protect against drainage; Murphy sought declaratory relief asserting compliance with the clause as written.
  • Trial court granted Murphy summary judgment; the court of appeals reversed, holding Murphy failed to conclusively prove the well satisfied the commonly understood meaning of an "offset well." The Texas Supreme Court granted review.
  • The Supreme Court (majority) reversed the court of appeals, holding the lease’s plain text required only drilling on the leased acreage to a depth adequate to test the same formation and, in the horizontal-shale context of these leases, no proximity/drainage requirement should be implied; judgment for Murphy reinstated (appellate fees removed). Justice Johnson dissented, arguing the term "offset well" retained its industry meaning (protection from drainage) and the clause is ambiguous.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument (Herbst) Defendant's Argument (Murphy) Held
Interpretation of "offset well" clause — does it require proximity/drainage protection? "Offset well" means a well placed close to the lease line to protect against drainage; proximity implied. Clause requires only commencement on leased acreage and drilling to a depth adequate to test the same formation; no proximity/drainage requirement. Majority: The clause's plain language governs; in the horizontal shale context the lease does not impose a proximity/drainage requirement — Murphy complied. Dissent: "offset" retains industry meaning; clause is ambiguous.
Use of extrinsic evidence (horizontal drilling context) to interpret lease Herbst: surrounding circumstances and industry usage support implying proximity/draintage meaning. Murphy: lease language controls; but horizontal-drilling context shows minimal drainage risk, supporting plain-text reading. Majority: Context (horizontal drilling) may inform meaning and supports plain-text interpretation. Dissent: Court improperly uses post‑execution technical materials and ignores lessors' deposition evidence; ambiguity remains.
Whether summary judgment was proper Herbst: Ambiguity and factual dispute (did well protect against drainage?) make summary judgment improper. Murphy: Unambiguous lease language; Murphy met its obligations, so summary judgment appropriate. Majority: Summary judgment proper for Murphy. Dissent: Summary judgment improper because reasonable alternative interpretation exists — remand required.
Effect of clause on implied covenant to protect from drainage Herbst: clause is a deemed‑drainage protection and should be read consistent with industry use and implied covenant principles. Murphy: The express clause defines the duty and supersedes implied covenant elements; it need not require proximity. Majority: The express terms control; they do not include a proximity requirement here. Dissent: Clause should be read consistent with traditional offset meaning that preserves protection against drainage.

Key Cases Cited

  • Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (standard of review for summary judgment)
  • Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. 2011) (contract interpretation begins with the instrument's language)
  • URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 543 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. 2018) (surrounding circumstances may inform but not contradict unambiguous contract language)
  • Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. 2011) (will not impose more stringent obligation than expressly defined)
  • Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008) (discussion of drainage and remedies, including offset wells)
  • Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1981) (implied covenant and protection against drainage)
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Case Details

Case Name: Murphy Exploration & Prod. Company-usa, Corp. v. Shirley Adams, Charlene Burgess, Willie Mae Herbst Jasik, William Albert Herbst, Helen Herbst, & R. May Oil & Gas Co.
Court Name: Texas Supreme Court
Date Published: Jun 1, 2018
Citations: 560 S.W.3d 105; No. 16–0505
Docket Number: No. 16–0505
Court Abbreviation: Tex.
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    Murphy Exploration & Prod. Company-usa, Corp. v. Shirley Adams, Charlene Burgess, Willie Mae Herbst Jasik, William Albert Herbst, Helen Herbst, & R. May Oil & Gas Co., 560 S.W.3d 105