Mullins v. City of New York
626 F.3d 47
| 2d Cir. | 2010Background
- 4300 current and former NYC sergeants sued City and NYPD for FLSA overtime violations (April 19, 2004).
- Parties agreed in May 2005 to limit depositions to a set of test plaintiffs from seventeen job categories, organized into three groups.
- January 2006: NYPD IAB-coordinated document collection from test plaintiffs and others; some collectors were plaintiffs.
- Concerns of plaintiffs about retaliation and intimidation grew, with contemporaneous testimony describing the process as a “raid.”
- March 2006: an Integrity Control Officer attended Sergeant Edward Scott’s deposition; Scott later faced an investigation over deposition testimony and retirement was deferred pending resolution; GO-15 of Sergeant Anthony Cioffi followed in February 2008.
- March 6, 2008: district court issued a TRO enjoining certain investigations; March 21, 2008: TRO converted to a preliminary injunction; this injunction was challenged and ultimately affirmed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether hearsay can support a preliminary injunction. | Mullins argues hearsay should be excluded. | NYPD argues hearsay is admissible for initial injunction determinations. | Hearsay may be considered; admissibility is weight, not disallowance, at this stage. |
| Whether the likelihood-of-success standard for FLSA retaliation applies. | Appellees contend they show probable retaliation against plaintiffs. | City/NYPD contend sufficient factual dispute exists. | Appellees established likelihood of success on the merits under FLSA retaliation. |
| Whether irreparable harm supports the injunction. | Retaliation risks and chilling effect threaten irreparable harm. | Harm can be remedied by later monetary damages; no irreparable harm shown. | There is irreparable harm risk from retaliation; injunction appropriate. |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion in injunctive relief. | Appellees claim district court properly weighed evidence. | District court misapplied standards or relied on insufficient evidence. | No abuse of discretion; district court acted within permissible range. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (U.S. 1981) (preliminary injunction standard; informality of evidence permissible)
- Brock v. Casey Truck Sales, Inc., 839 F.2d 872 (2d Cir.1988) (McDonnell Douglas framework for retaliation claims)
- Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560 (2d Cir.2000) (prima facie case elements for retaliation)
- Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33 (2d Cir.2000) (burden-shifting framework in retaliation cases)
- Holt v. Continental Group, Inc., 708 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.1983) (irreparable harm shown by threat of deterrence in retaliation)
- Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (U.S. 1981) (see above)
- Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700 (3d Cir.2004) (preliminary injunction evidence may include hearsay)
- Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir.1997) (preliminary injunction evidence standard)
- Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982 (11th Cir.1995) (preliminary injunction evidentiary standards)
- Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545 (5th Cir.1993) (acknowledges admissibility of otherwise inadmissible evidence for preliminary injunction)
- Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23 (1st Cir.1986) (early discussion on injunctive relief evidence)
- Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir.1984) (urgency of injunction affects admissible evidence)
- Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc discussion on admissible evidence at injunction stage)