Muffoletto v. Towers & Cambridge Landing
223 A.3d 1169
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2020Background
- Two adjacent condominium boat slips (Nos. 32 and 33) were constructed as part of a 1982 Cambridge Landing project; a 1984 aerial photo showed the slips at 19' (Towers) and 13' (Muffoletto) respectively, although the Site Plan showed approximately equal ~14'7" widths.
- Appellant Muffoletto bought unit 312-B and slip 33 in 2004 and later sued (2016), alleging predecessors moved the mooring piles pre-1984 to enlarge slip 32 to 19' and shrink slip 33 to 13', seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to restore equal 16' slips.
- The Council of Unit Owners acquired riparian rights from the developer in 1996; in 1999 it adopted a policy requiring owners who moved pilings to restore original locations upon sale. The Council issued an easement/license to Towers for slip 32 in 2000 "as now constructed."
- The circuit court found the pilings were in their present position by June 1984, concluded Muffoletto’s claims were time-barred under the statute of limitations (and laches), awarded sanctions to Towers for discovery violations, and entered summary judgment for Towers.
- On appeal the Court of Special Appeals affirmed: continuing-harm tolling did not apply because the alleged wrongful act (moving the piles) was a single, earlier act; laches barred equitable relief; the Court analyzed (but did not definitively decide) adverse-possession/prescription issues and treated licenses/easements as reflecting the slips “as constructed.”
Issues
| Issue | Muffoletto's Argument | Towers' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary judgment was improper because facts (when/if piles were moved) required credibility findings | Piles were moved to enlarge Towers’ slip; factual disputes require trial and declaration | The alleged pile move was a single act before June 1984; statutes/laches bar relief | Affirmed summary judgment; continuing-harm doctrine inapplicable because only a past act occurred and limitations/laches bar the claims |
| Whether the statute of limitations was tolled by continuing harm | Ongoing harm (slips remain in current config) renews limitations | Continuing harm doctrine requires a new affirmative act; mere continuing effect does not toll | Court held continuing harm does not apply; cause accrued when plaintiff knew or should have known (by 2004/2010) and suit filed too late |
| Whether a non‑corporeal license/easement portion can be lost by adverse possession/prescription | A licensed/incorporeal interest cannot be prescriptively reduced by another licensee | Licensed slip area is analogous to an easement and may be subject to prescriptive acquisition between licensees | Appellate court assumed—without deciding—that prescriptive principles could apply but concluded licenses issued "as constructed" and Council’s actions precluded prescriptive loss as to the riparian owner; no relief for Muffoletto |
| Whether trial court abused discretion imposing discovery sanctions without expressly cataloging Taliaferro factors | Sanctions improper because court did not explicitly apply the Taliaferro checklist | Violations were substantial, prejudicial, and deliberate; court considered context; sanctions discretionary | No abuse of discretion; sanctions ($4,331) were appropriate given repeated, substantial discovery failures |
Key Cases Cited
- Litz v. Maryland Dep’t of the Env’t, 434 Md. 623 (2013) (continuing-harm tolling requires a new, continuing affirmative act rather than mere continuing effects of an earlier act)
- Walton v. Network Solutions, 221 Md. App. 656 (2015) (distinguishes continuing torts from continuing ill effects; single earlier violation that causes continuing effects does not toll limitations)
- MacBride v. Pishvaian, 402 Md. 572 (2007) (deterioration or continuing effects are not new breaches for tolling purposes)
- Kirby v. Hook, 347 Md. 380 (1997) (explains doctrine of easement by prescription and adverse use elements)
- Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317 (1945) (prescriptive easement arises from adverse, exclusive, continuous use for statutory period)
- Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376 (1983) (factors trial courts should consider when imposing discovery sanctions)