Ms. L. v. U.S Immigration & Customs Enforcement
310 F. Supp. 3d 1133
S.D. Cal.2018Background
- Plaintiffs (parents) challenge a government practice of separating parents from their minor children at the border and failing to reunify them absent a determination the parent is unfit or dangerous. Plaintiffs brought a classwide action seeking a preliminary injunction.
- The sole claim at issue is a substantive due process claim: family integrity rights under the Fifth Amendment, measured by the "shocks the conscience" standard.
- The record shows separations occurred both before and after the administration's "zero tolerance" policy and affected parents who lawfully presented at ports of entry seeking asylum.
- The government lacked effective procedures to track separated children, enable parent–child communication, or proactively reunify parents and children; reunification was often delayed for months and typically required litigation.
- The court found that separations caused severe emotional and developmental harms to children and acute distress to parents, and that constitutional injury (and irreparable harm) was likely.
- The court granted a classwide preliminary injunction ordering (inter alia) that parents not be detained apart from their minor children absent a fitness/danger finding or a knowing voluntary declination to reunify; timeframes and communication/tracking steps for reunification were mandated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Likelihood of success on substantive due process claim | Separation of parents and children without a fitness/danger determination "shocks the conscience" and violates family integrity | Border enforcement and detention authority justify separations when necessary to enforce criminal/immigration laws | Court: Plaintiffs likely to succeed; family integrity applies at the border and practice as implemented is conscience-shocking given lack of individualized findings and procedures |
| 2. Irreparable harm | Separation of parent and child is an irreparable constitutional injury causing severe, long-term harm to children and parents | Government enforcement interests outweigh claimed harms; separations necessary in some enforcement contexts | Court: Irreparable harm established; constitutional deprivation and serious documented harms support injunction |
| 3. Balance of equities | Ending an unlawful practice imposes minimal burden on government and prevents severe harm to families | Injunction could impede enforcement of criminal and immigration laws | Court: Equities tip to plaintiffs; injunction does not bar enforcement but requires it to be conducted consistent with constitutional rights |
| 4. Public interest | Public interest favors protecting constitutional family rights and children's welfare | Public interest in effective law enforcement | Court: Public interest supports injunction; both enforcement and family integrity can be accommodated |
Key Cases Cited
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (describing "shocks the conscience" standard for substantive due process)
- Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (preliminary injunction standard requires likelihood of success and irreparable harm)
- Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981) (plaintiff need not prove entire case at preliminary injunction stage)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (parental rights are more precious than property interests)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (parental rights as fundamental liberty interest)
- Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting likelihood of success is most important Winter factor)
- Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2011) (family separation constituting irreparable harm)
- Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013) (ending unlawful practice imposes no harm on government; equitable considerations)
- Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014) (constitutional violation favors injunction; public interest consideration)
- Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000) (state has no interest in removing children absent reasonable suspicion of abuse or imminent danger)
