872 F. Supp. 2d 162
D. Conn.2012Background
- Diversity-based products liability action involving combination hormone therapy drugs Premarin and Prempro alleged to cause breast cancer.
- Plaintiff sues Wyeth for eleven counts, including strict liability design defect (Count II) and failure to warn among others.
- Court previously granted summary judgment on breach of express warranty and CUTPA and partial on alternative design theory; remaining counts treated as a single CPLA claim.
- Wyeth argues Connecticut does not recognize strict liability design-defect claims for prescription drugs under the CPLA, citing Restatement § 402A cmt. (k).
- Judge issues memorandum predicting how CT Supreme Court would interpret comment k and how design-warranty/warning claims should be litigated at trial.
- Key conclusion: CT would apply comment k as a case-by-case affirmative defense to design defects; warning defects remain governed by § 52-572q.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Connecticut recognize design-defect strict liability for prescription drugs? | Moss contends CT recognizes design defect claims under CPLA. | Wyeth argues comment k provides blanket immunity for all prescription drugs. | CT would adopt case-by-case defense under comment k. |
| How does comment k apply to prescription drug design defects? | Design defect claims survive unless proven unavoidably unsafe with warnings. | Comment k bars recovery for unavoidably unsafe drugs with proper warnings and manufacturing. | Comment k applied as affirmative defense on a case-by-case basis. |
| What is the scope of warning defect liability for prescription drugs under CT law? | 52-572q imposes strict liability for inadequate warnings. | Warnings doctrine interacts with negligence principles; warnings can be adequate or inadequate. | Warning defects assessed under § 52-572q; foreseeability and knowledge limit warnings. |
| Is the learned intermediary doctrine relevant to design defect and warning claims? | Learned intermediary doctrine affects warnings analysis under CT law. | Doctrine supports physician as intermediary; does not immunize design defects. | Learned intermediary doctrine partially informs design-warnings analysis; not a shield for design defects. |
Key Cases Cited
- Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 257 Conn. 365, 778 A.2d 829 (2001) (Conn. 2001) (adopts learned intermediary doctrine; discusses comment k context)
- Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199, 694 A.2d 1319 (1997) (Conn. 1997) (defines strict liability tests and consumer expectations)
- Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989) (case-by-case view of comment k; affirmative defense approach)
- Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969) (rejects blanket strict liability immunity; warns on design defects)
- Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988) (comment k applied in broader prescription drug context)