Mosley v. People, 2017 CO 20

Victor Mosley was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault; the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial based on Confrontation Clause error.
Under § 18-1-405(2), the trial court’s receipt of the appellate mandate (Sept. 19, 2007) triggered a six-month speedy-trial period for retrial.
Mosley waived the initial retrial deadline, extending it; trial was set and then the prosecution requested a continuance because the complaining witness could not be located.
The trial court found the witness material and that the prosecution exercised due diligence, granted a continuance under § 18-1-405(6)(g)(I), and reset trial; a mistrial later occurred due to a hung jury.
Mosley moved to dismiss, arguing (1) subsection (6) exclusions do not apply to retrials under subsection (2), so the continuance improperly extended the § 18-1-405(2) six-month deadline; and (2) alternatively, the prosecution lacked due diligence.
The trial court dismissed; the court of appeals reversed, holding subsection (6) exclusions apply to retrials and that the prosecution had been diligent. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Do subsection (6) exclusions apply to the six-month retrial period in § 18-1-405(2)?	Mosley: No — subsection (6) expressly references only subsection (1), so exclusions don’t apply to subsection (2); retrial delay beyond six months requires dismissal.	People: Yes — subsection (2) clarifies the trigger for the subsection (1) right; subsection (6) exclusions apply because the basic speedy-trial right and remedy derive from subsection (1).	Held: Exclusions in subsection (6) apply to retrials under subsection (2); subsection (1) establishes the basic right and remedy and (2) merely identifies the retrial trigger.
Was the continuance justified under § 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) (i.e., did the prosecution exercise due diligence)?	Mosley: No — prosecution did not act with sufficient diligence to locate the witness and needed only a few weeks, so the court abused discretion granting a six-month exclusion.	People: Yes — prosecution investigated, learned witness was in California, coordinated with California prosecutors and reasonably relied on the time required for out-of-state service/rendition.	Held: Trial court did not abuse its discretion; record supports finding of due diligence and reasonable expectation witness would be available.

People v. Deason, 670 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1983) (statute requires dismissal when defendant not tried within six months absent express statutory exclusions)
People v. Jamerson, 596 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1979) (applied subsection (6) exclusion to toll retrial period following reversal)
People v. Runningbear, 753 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1988) (statutory provisions must be read as a whole to effectuate legislative intent)
People v. Gallegos, 946 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1997) (speedy-trial provisions should not be applied mechanically; balance competing interests)
People v. Roberts, 146 P.3d 589 (Colo. 2006) (speedy trial protects defendant and public interests)
People v. Duncan, 31 P.3d 874 (Colo. 2001) (statutory speedy-trial questions are matters of law reviewed de novo)