Moses Stryker v. City of Homewood, 978 F.3d 769

Background

Early-morning dispute in Walmart parking lot: Stryker (a truck driver) and a complainant were separated by Officer Jason Davis; Davis turned off his dash camera on arrival.
Stryker retrieved a company camera to photograph the other vehicle; Davis told him not to take pictures and ordered him to put the camera away.
According to Stryker, Davis suddenly tased him in the back without announcing an arrest, kicked him, and then struck him repeatedly—breaking his jaw—after Stryker retreated into his truck and was later tased again through an open window.
Officers Waid and Blake arrived, helped remove and handcuff Stryker, and (per Stryker) continued to kick, strike, and choke him after he was compliant; Waid admitted striking Stryker on the ground.
Criminally, Stryker was convicted only of a municipal failure-to-comply ordinance; resist/arrest-related charges were dismissed or resulted in acquittal.
The district court granted summary judgment to the officers and the City based on qualified immunity and declined to retain state-law claims; the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding disputed facts required a trial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Excessive force: initial tasing by Officer Davis	Stryker: Davis tased him in the back without warning while he was compliant/returning to his truck, so the taser was excessive	Davis: Stryker was belligerent, reached into his pocket and resisted, and an arm-bar/other force preceded the taser, making the taser reasonable	Reversed summary judgment: viewed in Stryker’s favor, Graham factors favor an excessive-force finding; tasing a compliant, nonthreatening misdemeanant was objectively unreasonable and clearly established law pre-incident
Excessive force: force after removal (kicking/striking/choking)	Stryker: officers continued to beat/kick him after he submitted and was controlled, which is gratuitous force	Officers: force was necessary to gain compliance; they deny continued force after compliance (though Waid admitted some strikes)	Reversed: if jury credits Stryker, continued force on a compliant suspect is a clearly established Fourth Amendment violation; summary judgment improper
Qualified immunity for Officers Waid & Blake	Stryker: they participated in post-removal force and are not entitled to immunity if force continued after compliance	Officers: they did not use unconstitutional force once Stryker complied	Reversed as to summary judgment: credibility dispute (a classic jury question) precludes granting qualified immunity at summary judgment
Municipal liability & state-law claims	Stryker: City liable for unconstitutional force and state tort claims should proceed	City: no underlying constitutional violation, so no municipal liability; district court should decline state claims	Reversed and remanded: because factual disputes defeat qualified immunity, district court’s grant to City and dismissal of state claims must be reconsidered on remand

Key Cases Cited

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (framework for evaluating police use of force)
Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (tasing belligerent motorist found not excessive)
Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2011) (tasing a compliant, nonthreatening suspect violates the Fourth Amendment)
Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (gratuitous force on nonresisting suspect is excessive)
Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2002) (minor-severity offenses weigh against force)
County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017) (must analyze each alleged use of force independently)
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (qualified-immunity analysis can present a gray area)
Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir. 1997) (force after surrender can be excessive)
Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000) (post-resistance strikes may be unconstitutional)
Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2013) (credibility disputes over force are jury issues)